11

THE GREAT INVERSION, OR COURT VERSUS COUNTRY: A COMPARISON OF THE REVOLUTION SETTLEMENTS IN ENGLAND (1688-1721) AND AMERICA (1776-1816)

JOHN M. MURRIN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Americans have always shared one conviction about their Revolution: it was a good thing for the United States and the entire world.[1] The revolutionary generation believed that its principles would benevolently affect social conditions, agriculture, political economy, the fine arts, and even basic demographic trends. Only now are many of these themes being recovered. In the nineteenth century, constitutional questions became increasingly separable from broad social issues in a way that the eighteenth century had never imagined. Thus early chroniclers of the Revolution began to lose some of the movement's context even while quoting directly from its fundamental documents. They explained and defended the Revolution in terms essentially constitutional and political, as the triumph of liberty, equality, and limited government against the menace of irresponsible power and aristocratic privilege—rather feeble dangers, they somewhat paradoxically implied, if only

by giving these challenges little real chance of success in America's unique, libertarian environment, which they found at work in the very first settlements. Whatever the Revolution thereby lost in dramatic appeal—and the triumph of the inevitable creates great drama only when the result is tragic—it gained in mythic power even among trained historians. Against its immortal principles, all previous and subsequent events had to be measured.

The Revolution has seemed a living tradition, as against a finite past event, to the extent that Americans have expanded its values to include more people over time. By well-known stages, the republic's definition of citizenship has grown from propertied, white, Protestant, adult, male householders in 1775 to embrace all adults over eighteen today. This theme, and the extension of egalitarianism into economic relationships, have between them organized most serious history yet written about the United States. Complex statistical examinations of social mobility, for example, are really asking whether the Revolution's heirs have fulfilled its promise. Some scholars even see in this country "the first new nation" and in the Revolution the world's first successful revolt against colonialism. To them the revolutionary tradition is not only alive in America, but highly relevant for all mankind.[2] It is exportable. In less discreet hands, this argument almost suggests at times that, if only developing nations can learn to imitate the Federal Constitution and adopt a variant of the American party system, something like the millennium will overtake the globe.

Except perhaps for numerous immigrants to this country, the rest of the world has never quite agreed and, today more than ever, scorns the message. Outsiders who have commented on the American scene over the past two centuries have responded with varying degrees of sympathy. Well into the nineteenth century, European revolutionaries generally admired the American republic, but apart from advocating such specific techniques as written constitutions

and the process of ratification, their approval fell short of direct emulation. Since Marx, they have tended increasingly to identify America as the enemy of revolution, not its exemplar.[3] Yet Tocqueville and Lord Bryce toiled thoughtfully and appreciatively to grasp the interaction of American politics and society. One twentieth-century French observer, who dismissed the United States as the only country in world history to go from barbarism to decadence without passing through civilization, evidently abandoned the attempt. In general, foreign critics have found American politics amusing, idiosyncratic, peculiar, trivial, evasive of real issues, bombastic, eccentric, incomprehensible, boring —but inimitable in any case. From this perspective the United States appears less as the mother of democracy than as a precocious child of Britain by a difficult first marriage to mercantilism. The immensely powerful offspring has remained without heirs, but Britain, through a second marriage to nineteenth-century liberalism, has passed on her parliamentary system to much of the world: Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, remote Japan, India, and, less happily, South Africa and Rhodesia.

Yet at least since Tocqueville, outsiders—even those who impatiently dismiss the American polity—often succumb to sheer fascination with its social system and, above all, its standard of living. IBM and Pepsi-Cola seem more likely than Thomas Jefferson to sweep the world. American affluence remains highly exportable, although the takers have ironically been Western Europe, Japan, and Taiwan instead of Third World nations which, while engrossing the attention of modernization theorists, confront the United States through revolution or the threat of revolution rather than through grateful imitation. This trend should not shock anyone, but the misleading image of a "new nation" does appear to have created different expectations. The term applies far more aptly to the United States than to the Third World, in which virtually every society is far older than Jamestown or Plymouth. Only Canada, Australia, and New Zealand truly compare with the United States in this respect, but by the logic of metaphoric tyranny, they are usually considered part of the mature or developed world. Significantly, their traditions range from a loyalist or antirevolutionary asylum in Ontario to variants of radicalism in Australia and New Zealand, but none claims a transforming revolutionary heritage. Thus in one sense the American Revolution has severed the United States from its most conspicuous social analogues around the globe without linking it very usefully with the rest of the world.

I

American historians have never convincingly united the idealistic and social themes that have emerged from the Revolution. Justifications of the principles of 1776 have continued without break since the event itself, but a coherent social interpretation of the era finally appeared only with the Progressive generation of Carl Becker, Charles Beard, Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., and John Franklin Jameson. Partly because most Progressives refused to take seriously the lofty pronouncements of revolutionary spokesmen, we remain more divided than ever about the merits of this approach and what, if anything, it has achieved of lasting value. "The popular view of the Revolution as a great forensic controversy over abstract governmental rights will not bear close scrutiny," affirmed Schlesinger. "At best, an exposition of the political theories of the anti-parliamentary party is an account of their retreat from one strategic position to another. . . . Without discounting in any way the propagandist value attaching to popular shibboleths as such," he concluded, "it may as well be admitted that the colonists would have lost their case if the decision had turned upon an impartial consideration of the legal prin-

ciples involved."[4] Ideology nearly always masked economic interests, Progressives believed, whether those of merchants, speculators, planters, or small farmers.

Then, twenty-five years ago, Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan published *The Stamp Act Crisis, Prologue to Revolution*. Emphasizing that revolutionary spokesmen did announce clear and consistent principles, the Morgans left no doubt what they thought was at stake in 1765: "if England chose to force the issue [of taxation without consent]," they explained, "the colonists would have to decide . . . whether they would be men and not English or whether they would be English and not men." This conviction did not blind the Morgans to a swirl of conflicting interests that varied widely from one colony to another, but on the whole they found ideology and interest mutually compatible rather than antagonistic. More strikingly, perhaps, their account displayed a keener sympathy for the plight of early loyalists than anything yet written in the tradition of Whig history. Their series of vivid personal sketches described them as honest and intelligent men trapped on the wrong side of a revolutionary situation that would never have occurred had London listened to their advice before 1765.[5]

These themes soon acquired different overtones. "Consensus" historians, led by Robert E. Brown, found no room whatever for economic and social conflict in late colonial America. The settlers fought the Revolution to preserve existing liberties against British tyranny and aristocratic arrogance.[6] With a much subtler approach, Bernard Bailyn and his students at Harvard emerged as an "ideological school" that dominated the 1960s, despite persistent radical dissent from Jesse Lemisch and Staughton Lynd. Moving beyond what he saw as a rather narrow constitutionalism in Morgan, Bailyn exuberantly explored the broader ideological world of the late eighteenth century. His patriots, conscious heirs of British opposition writers, explained all history as the desperate struggle of rapacious power against delicate liberty which, once lost, could never again be

recovered. He stressed what had been only a minor motif for the Morgans—the readiness of each side in the struggle to detect the foulest conspiratorial motives in its opponents. Colonists easily discovered proof that London was plotting to destroy liberty in America, and Englishmen quickly perceived a colonial conspiracy aimed at independence. Critics of Bailyn's recent biography of Thomas Hutchinson apparently fear that this emphasis is now verging on neo-loyalism. The Morgans' decent men caught on the wrong side of a revolutionary dilemma have become possibly the sanest individuals in a paranoid world, even though Bailyn has explicitly stopped short of such a formulation.[7]

But while neo-Whigs, consensus historians, and the ideological school battled to define their versions of the Revolution, Merrill Jensen and a remarkable group of talented students at Wisconsin revived the concern of the Progressives with social conflict and clashing interests. In the last decade they have thoroughly documented acute social tensions in one colony after another, and since 1970 have pretty well dominated the study of the Revolution. Not surprisingly, most of them see Bailyn's ideological interpretation as their chief obstacle or even enemy, and they remain highly critical of his failure to give adequate consideration to economic issues.[8]

In general the ideological school invokes a unique Revolution to explain one of its major concerns: the uniqueness of America. Social conditions are indeed a part of this singularity, but the critical shift to an open or fluid society had occurred long before 1760 and, in any case, did not cause the upheaval after 1765. Ideology did. Surprisingly, the Harvard school has emptied even the colonists' ideology of the economic content it manifestly did possess, as other intellectual historians are now showing. With Morgan somewhere between the two poles on this question, most members of the Wisconsin school seem much less fascinated with the uniqueness of America. They hope to make the Revolution more relevant to our time by linking it, if only

by implication, with other great modern upheavals, beginning with that of France in 1789. Only a truly revolutionary Revolution can do the job. And if one compares Alfred Cobban's emphasis on the revolt of minor officeholders in France with James Kirby Martin's similar discovery for all of the colonies, the French and American Revolutions had similarities of origin that most historians have missed, just as on the ideological plane the two movements articulated similar commitments to liberty and equality against the corrupting force of power and privilege.[9]

Thus to a distressing degree the historiography of the Revolution now resembles the children's hand-symbol game of scissors, paper, and rock. Scissors cut paper, paper covers rock, and rock blunts scissors. In this case Morgan's consistent constitutionalism (or neo-Whiggery) slashed through a confusing tangle of Progressive interests, Bailyn's enlarged ideology dulled the Morgans' constitutionalism, and neo-Progressive interests have blanketed Bailyn's ideology.

Increasingly, most colonial specialists seem compelled to pledge firm allegiance to one standard or the other. Despite the mediating efforts of Gordon Wood, J. R. Pole, Kenneth Lockridge, and Eric Foner, a widening gap has opened between the ideological and neo-progressive schools. Each either attacks or, perhaps more devastatingly, simply ignores the contributions of the other.[10] Without pretending to reconcile all differences, this chapter hopes to suggest that the alternatives are not all that stark. An expansion of ideological content to incorporate the economic issues that it really did address will surely help. And a closer attention to economic interests than Beard or Schlesinger attempted will heighten, not lessen, their importance. For example, we should not expect all merchants to have thought or acted alike on political questions. They differed considerably on access to capital, ownership of vessels, the kind of markets they traded with, length of time in their occupation, and the possession of office. Two merchants

could behave quite differently, and yet still be pursuing their own particular economic interests.

Any absolute dichotomy between the two schools is unrealistic. The Revolution cannot make sense without both of them. Two trends are now so carefully documented about the period 1760 to 1815 that they appear almost beyond challenge, at least to this historian. Ideological commitment became measurably more intense and precise, foreclosing one option after another in the decades after 1760. By turns oceanic empire, imperial federation, monarchy itself, and Hamiltonian Federalism disappeared as viable solutions to North America's problems. And more rapidly than at any time since 1700, and more universally than at any point since the founding of Jamestown, social conflict escalated into the crisis stage as religious controversy, urban rioting, anti-rent upheavals, the regulator movements, immensely destructive partisan warfare, mutiny in the Continental Line, Shays' Rebellion coupled with a myriad of lesser disturbances in the mid-1780s, the whiskey insurrection, Fries' Revolt, Gabriel's slave uprising, the Baltimore riots of 1812, and the Hartford Convention paraded past bewildered contemporaries in frightening succession. To this list one could add the Newburgh Conspiracy, various separatist movements in Vermont and Tennessee, and Aaron Burr's strange activities in the West —all with unrealized potential for acute social disturbance.

The historian's task should not be the defense of one of these themes to the exclusion of the other. If at all possible, he should try to explain both. Ideological intensification and social upheaval really did happen—simultaneously. But did they mutually reinforce or impede one another? Or did they interact in different ways at different times? This chapter does assume that the two trends will combine more explosively when they support each other. Working at cross-purposes, they will generate a more mixed and confusing situation. On the whole they did become ever

more organically related throughout the era, with the Stamp Act crisis as a major early exception. Social turmoil, which arose over a wide variety of religious, economic, and political issues in the 1750s and 1760s, became inextricably connected to the classic ideological tension between Court and Country in the 1780s and 1790s. Indeed, economic change, the danger of popular upheaval, the emergence of systematic opposition within a republican government, and the imperatives of ideology all united to shape the issues and alternatives of the first American party system after 1790.

One massive uncertainty underlay much of the turmoil. Could thirteen extremely heterogeneous societies with no tradition of continental unity battle their way from colonialism to independence as something resembling a coherent nation? In 1815 the new republic just barely emerged intact from the Age of Revolution, but its unity remained precarious, threatened thereafter by internal forces rather than by European powers feeding upon internal tensions. Its ideological configuration had been set for perhaps the next century, and social violence would henceforth erupt mostly over ethnic conflict (including slavery) rather than over Court-Country issues.

To appreciate how all of these questions interacted until 1815, one must broaden the context considerably. Let me begin, not by employing a French Revolutionary model that became relevant to the men of 1776 only later in their lives, but by comparing the American Revolution with the one major predecessor almost universally admired by contemporaries, however differently they interpreted it: England's Revolution of 1688.[11] Drawing more on J.G.A. Pocock, J. H. Plumb, Isaac Kramnick, Lance Banning, and Drew R. McCoy than upon extensive original research, this chapter suggests an elementary framework for restoring some of the dialogue among colonial historians. What follows is surely not the only way in which the period can

be discussed, but I hope it is broad and flexible enough to remain open-ended and inclusive. It does not read out of the Revolution whole areas of experience vastly important to participants.

Much can be learned by contrasting America's "Revolution Settlement" through the War of 1812 with that of England through the Hanoverian Succession and the rise of Sir Robert Walpole. In comparing revolutions, most historians have obtained different results depending upon what they emphasized—the origins, the most extreme stage reached in particular upheavals, or the overall process, structure, and permanence of revolutionary change. To R. R. Palmer, the American and French Revolutions seem broadly similar because the origins of both reflect acute resentment against arbitrary power and legal privilege, even if Americans found less amiss in their social order than Frenchmen did. To both American consensus historians and the European Left since Marx, the two movements remain irrevocably different because the United States never experienced anything as radical as Robespierre's Jacobin republic. Those, such as Crane Brinton, who stress the "anatomy," the "natural history," or the structure of revolutions, have usually tried to reduce all of them to a set of similar stages through which each must pass, culminating in a conservative reaction or counter-revolution.[12]

Any attempt to compare revolution settlements probably resembles Brinton's approach more than the others, for it must ask what everything was like once the process had run its course. But we shall be pondering differences as much as similarities. To take only one conspicuous example, the English Civil Wars generated a Restoration which, modified in 1688 and more often since 1832, has nonetheless survived ever since. Enemies of the French Revolution used their armies to impose upon France a Restoration that quickly fell apart. In our own century the Russian and Chinese Revolutions certainly have created authoritarian govern-

ments, but neither is in any meaningful sense a restoration of the Old Regime, as any czarist or mandarin yet living will testify. Although the United States experienced no true restoration, widespread fears that Federalists intended something close to one fueled political life for a generation after 1789.

The term "Revolution Settlement" is used in this chapter to describe the pattern, whatever it happens to be, assumed by a revolutionary regime after the turmoil itself is over. Once the process has been completed, for an indefinite period of future time internal forces alone will not alter the regime or constitutional system in more than secondary details. This expansion of the time boundary permits important contrasts to emerge, mostly between Britain and America, but also between both of them and France, although the French example shall not be emphasized here. England's Glorious Revolution resolved itself into a stable system of Walpolean politics, operating within the world's most dynamic economy. The American Revolution reached stability with the triumph of Jeffersonian government between 1801 and 1815. The French Revolution gave birth to a Napoleonic Empire that became so deeply entrenched in the society that it could be overthrown only by the combined armies and fleets of the rest of Europe.

A sustained effort at Anglo-American comparison may even suggest why Americans seem unable to resist a dichotomy that pits a political against a social revolution. The perplexity of foreign viewers can be enlightening in this respect, for the United States is not just a political system, nor a dynamic industrial order that mysteriously generates "the American way of life," but a complex interaction between the two. Because the Jeffersonians rescued the polity and the Revolution mostly by divorcing them from larger patterns of economic and social change, this antinomy remains perhaps the single most troublesome legacy of 1776, a continuing barrier to the nation's understanding of what it has become and how it got that way.

II

By 1688 England had long been divided into Court and Country alignments which in the previous decade had coalesced into the Tory and Whig parties. As used here, "Court" and "Country" have strong ideological connotations that suggest the normal though not the possible boundaries of political division. Radical dissent had moved well beyond these limits during the Civil War and Interregnum and, by the very act of doing so, had largely defined acceptable boundaries for subsequent generations. Court apologists were intensely statist and, in their most extreme form, might seek to emulate a continental European monarchy. They tried to endow the government with the resources and vigor necessary to command great respect abroad and maintain order at home. Country spokesmen expressed strong suspicion of government, might even at times seem isolationist in foreign policy, and preferred to rely upon local resources and institutions for the preservation of domestic order. By contrast, the labels Whig or Tory, and later Federalist or Republican, describe political coalitions or "parties" usually constrained to operate within the framework of Court-Country tensions. Within each party, members could assume different positions along the Court-Country spectrum and, especially in Britain, the parties themselves could shift massively from one persuasion to the other.

After the Glorious Revolution the English Court finally abandoned the persecution of dissenters for limited toleration, and it accepted a permanent role for Parliament in the governance of the realm. But in other respects its goals after 1688 merely continued, intensified, and extended the policies of Charles II and James II. William III and his successors still sought the means to restrain opposition at home and to conduct a vigorous foreign policy against French expansion—a standing army, a huge navy, ample revenues to wage war despite the inevitable disruption of

trade and customs duties, a reasonably effective bureaucracy, and increased patronage. The Country opposition, staunchly Whig in the 1680s, preferred a militia to a standing army, limited revenues, small government dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the gentry, and place bills and frequent elections to prevent Court patronage from corrupting the House of Commons.[13]

Almost continuous warfare with France imposed terrible strains on these alignments over the next generation. None aroused more acute anxiety than the financial revolution of the 1690s, through which England acquired for the first time a modern fiscal system. A funded national debt which would mushroom spectacularly from £2 million under James II to £130 million by 1763, the Bank of England, the London Stock Exchange, the great recoinage, a permanent land tax and other internal revenues to offset the wartime uncertainties of port duties, heightened reliance upon an enlarged East India Company and later the South Sea Company—all these date from the 1690s.[14] Although the point remains much more debatable, the same era may also have rediscovered the poor as a major social problem.[15] It certainly did indulge in a quite undisciplined fascination for what Daniel Defoe called "projects"—novelties or improvements ranging from unsuccessful Country experiments such as land banks to the steam engines of Thomas Savery and Thomas Newcomen.[16] The number of new patents rose sharply in the 1690s, with sixty-four issued in the three-year period from 1691 to 1693.[17] In a bizarre way, the whole trend culminated in the year of the Bubble on the eve of Walpole's triumph. Thus 1720 witnessed the creation of a company to bleach hair, another for the transmutation of quicksilver, a firm that proposed to insure marriages against divorce, and still another that tried to market an air pump for the brain. Best of all, perhaps, if possibly mythical, was the stock issue of £3,000 snapped up in a single day for "a company to carry on an undertaking of great advantage but nobody to know what it is."[18]

In the era of savage party conflict between 1689 and 1714 that brought voter participation to an amazing peak, these tensions worked an incredible reversal in political alignments. Continuous warfare and the exceptionally high land tax ruined numerous members of the gentry and yeomanry but offered unprecedented opportunities for assured income to investors in the public funds and for instant fortunes to other men able to profit from the government's expanding activities by making shrewd or lucky investments at the right moment. Many of the gentry sourly concluded that the state was destroying traditional families only to raise a swarm of greedy parvenus upon their ruin. To an undetermined extent, in other words, the government's fiscal policy did redistribute wealth.[19] And in a pattern whose roots lay far back in the seventeenth century, the traditional monopolies, such as the East India and Royal African Companies, had tended to be Tory, while merchants who had developed newer markets with little Court protection rallied strongly to the Whigs. Especially in the East India trade, the intruders first broke the monopoly to force their way in and later took it over for themselves.

Accordingly the Whigs, by pursuing their anti-French policies, emerged as the Court party by the Hanoverian Succession, a transformation conspicuous in greater London as early as 1691.[20] Whigs embraced the new dynasty, the debt, the Bank of England, the great corporations, a permanent standing army, the world's mightiest navy, and enough patronage to guarantee the docility of Parliament in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances. At the first opportunity they reduced the frequency of elections from three years to seven, quietly restricted the number of eligible voters in many boroughs, eliminated actual contests for seats through prior gentlemanly understandings wherever possible, and almost succeeded in converting the House of Lords into a self-perpetuating corporate body. Whig apologists, to nobody's surprise, often defended moderns against ancients in the "battle of the books" that raged among

Augustan literati. Some Whigs even justified 1688 as a Revolution in the modern sense, one that permanently changed things for the better. Lacking from the modern formula was, of course, the legitimation of violence. Court and Country, Whig and Tory, confined their idealization of liberty within boundaries that safely defined public order as a primary value.[21]

Tories, who under Anne seemed to be emerging as the majority party on all issues but the Succession, over which they were badly divided, had originated as the Court supporters of Charles II during the Exclusion Crisis. But as the financial revolution took its toll, they began to question whether France was any more a natural enemy than the Dutch Republic. Beginning in the 1690s, and especially with their exclusion from power after 1714, they tended overwhelmingly to assume the attitudes of a Country opposition. They defended 1688, not as a new departure, but as the restoration of the ancient and virtuous constitutional balance of King, Lords, and Commons, once threatened by James II and now menaced from a new and more sinister direction by the fiscal revolution and the patronage politics of Walpole's "Robinarchy." In sum, they now embarked upon what Pocock has called a "quarrel with modernity," siding with the ancients in the battle of the books. It was now the turn of the Tories to enlist, far more successfully than Court Whigs, the greatest literary talents of the age to denounce a standing army, bloated patronage, and above all the corrupt alliance between government and the money power that threatened to destroy the virtue and independence of the gentry and the House of Commons.[22]

Thus England's Revolution Settlement created a centralized system of Court politics and one-party rule, closely tied to the disturbing new world of high finance and the beginnings of intensive economic growth that may have accompanied it.[23] It was resisted, usually on "Revolution principles," by a Country opposition that was mostly Tory, although it included a remnant of "Real Whigs" who remained faithful to the ideals of the 1680s. This opposition, even in its loosely united "patriot" phase of the 1730s, occasionally extracted concessions from the government. But it never acquired enough strength to regain control of Parliament despite extensive gentry support, considerable voting strength in such remaining open constituencies as the counties and larger boroughs, and highly articulate expression in the press.

III

Now let us shift to North America. This chapter cannot discuss broad colonial developments beyond observing a few trends. First, the generation that experienced the stabilization of Britain's constitutional order also witnessed the institutional elaboration of imperial control. The Board of Trade, the most comprehensive Navigation Act, and the system of vice-admiralty courts all appeared in the 1690s. Army officers, beginning with men who rose through the household of James II while he was still Duke of York, and followed by abler men trained under the Duke of Marlborough, took over and largely defined the office of royal governor in America and the West Indies. By the 1720s a clear pattern had also emerged to determine which colonies would be royal and which would remain proprietary or corporate.[24] Second, colonial military and fiscal practices also took shape in a way that would characterize most of the coming century. The settlers fought their wars with "marching forces" that were institutionally distinct from traditional militia without ever quite becoming a standing army. Apparently with little appreciation for the ideological implications of their decisions, one colony after another also embraced the "Country" fiscal expedients that England had rejected in the 1690s, especially bills of credit receivable in taxes, and land banks. Inflated exchange rates raised havoc and political temperatures in the Carolinas and New

England, but these devices worked nicely from Maryland to New York and generally held their value.[25]

As a whole, the colonies did not surrender indiscriminately to Country ideology. Instead political developments in the half-century after the Peace of Utrecht created a spectrum of regimes from north to south. The northern wing produced successful "Court" constitutions in the New Hampshire of Benning Wentworth (1741–1767) and the Massachusetts of William Shirley and Thomas Pownall (1741–1760). New Jersey displayed fainter trends in the same direction after 1750. In New York, an effective system of court politics emerged around 1715 only to decay under inept and greedy governors (1732–1753). In each of these colonies successful governors relied heavily upon various forms of patronage to discipline competing factions and secure the support of the assembly. When used cautiously, such tactics appeared both necessary and salutary in diversifying societies whose factions could jeopardize public order. One measure of the achievement of someone like Shirley was the occasional appearance of Country ideology in newspapers or pamphlets—the effort, as in Britain, of a minority faction unable to gain control of the assembly and use it as a platform against the governor. But when governors did fail and had to duel with the assembly itself, the language of these debates became formal and legalistic, pitting older seventeenth-century definitions of prerogative and privilege against each other.[26]

The southern wing of provinces evolved stable "Country" constitutions in Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia. In these places strong, independent governors and strong, independent assemblies learned to cooperate voluntarily in the best traditions of Country ideology, usually after an initial period of bitter recrimination. Each had ample power to thwart but not dominate the other and hence took elaborate precautions to avoid real offense. This system worked because a homogeneous planter class, untroubled by serious factional rifts, was producing the tobacco and rice that the

empire desired, while the empire provided valuable naval, military, and economic services in return. By mid-century able governors usually got what they sought from the assembly, but they did it through highly ritualized forms of persuasion, not by creating a corps of placemen in the assembly. In these provinces the appearances of Country ideology reflected social harmony, political stability, and effective royal leadership.[27]

North Carolina, divided into competing rice and tobacco regions and troubled by a rapidly growing and exceptionally turbulent back country, never acquired a homogeneous planter class upon which a Country constitution could be built. Similarly Rhode Island and Connecticut, which lacked royal government altogether, deviated from the emerging "Court" norm of New England. In between the two wings of colonies lay two provinces that really were the kind of exception that proves the rule. Maryland's proprietors continually tried to play Court politics in a Country environment. Pennsylvania found itself imprisoned by a Country constitution—the heritage of early Quakers—in a Court environment of diversifying trade, ethnic and religious rivalries, and persistently clashing interests. Neither colony achieved political stability in the eighteenth century.[28]

Here, too, fiscal systems suggested the possible extremes. In the 1750s, when most of New England voluntarily abandoned paper money for orthodox Court finance, Virginia ardently embraced paper for the first time, eventually provoking Parliament's Currency Act of 1764.[29]

Real limits to parliamentary control of imperial affairs also appeared in this period, most of them by 1713. Parliament amply demonstrated its power over oceanic affairs, which may in fact have been more effective over colonial commerce than it was over Britain's own.[30] But Parliament never successfully extended its authority over internal colonial issues. With only trivial exceptions, British ships monopolized colonial trade, colonial staples were exported

to Britain for consumption or reexport, and European and Asian goods reached America via British home ports. Until the reorganization of the 1760s, Parliament got much poorer results regulating commerce between North America and the West Indies, whether through the Molasses Act of 1733 or various measures that tried to interdict wartime trade with the enemy.[31] But Parliament's attempts at internal regulation of the colonies, from the Coin Act of 1708 through the various White Pines, Hat, Iron, and New England Currency Acts, either misfired or were openly ignored and thwarted. Without active local cooperation, imperial officials simply lacked the leverage to secure compliance. To its later discomfort, the empire had drifted into a federal arrangement, with the division of power following an internal-external (or continental-oceanic) axis that hardly anyone but Benjamin Franklin understood or could justify.[32]

These considerations barely indicate how difficult a task the achievement of colonial unity would be. Even more than Italy or Germany in the early nineteenth century, "America" was only a geographical expression before the revolutionary era. Not even a unique language distinguished it from the rest of the British world. Its cultural heritage and its symbols of unity—the Crown, the mixed and balanced constitution, military glory (especially during the Seven Years War)—were predominantly British and in no way exclusively American. Of course New England took great pride in its puritan tradition, but this heritage set off the region from the rest of North America as much as from Britain. In an elementary matter such as the use of common symbols for the continent and its people, Englishmen—who had difficulty distinguishing one colony from another—were measurably more inclined to speak of "America" and "Americans" than were the settlers themselves.[33] Predictions of eventual colonial union and independence came almost exclusively from British placemen and travelers in the New World, not from the actual colonists, who at most mused now and then on the continent's fantastic rate of population growth and the power this trend would bring in a century or two.[34]

Nor had North America evolved anything remotely resembling an integrated continental economy by the 1760s. Instead its separate parts found themselves tied ever more tightly to an imperial economy that was becoming more efficient and more interdependent, often with uncomfortable results for major participants. Per capita colonial imports of British products rose markedly after mid-century. The coastal trade probably was increasing more rapidly than its transatlantic counterparts but not yet fast enough to offset the primacy of the empire as an economic entity. As insurance rates fell and the turnaround time for vessels lessened, profit margins also dropped in the face of increasing competition. Crises in the London money market in 1762 and 1772 rapidly created distress on the other side of the ocean.[35]

Indeed, something like an imperial rather than an American land and labor market had reached a high level of development by the 1760s. Extremely high rents in Ireland and Scotland provoked massive emigration to North America, where land remained plentiful. If not checked in time, this trend, according to some observers, threatened to depopulate Britain's Celtic fringe. It deeply worried powerful landlords in the affected areas, some of whom—such as Lord Hillsborough, the American Secretary after 1768—blamed America for their difficulties and, in consequence, easily became hard-liners on imperial policy.[36]

At one level, then, the American Revolution was a crisis in imperial *integration* which London simply could not handle. Economic, social, and intellectual trends were pulling together the separate societies of the empire in ways that Whitehall neither understood nor appreciated, for events were rapidly outpacing Britain's century-old conception of imperial relationships. Thus in the decade after 1765 the home government performed what should

rank with the most stupendous achievements of the age. It united all thirteen colonies in armed resistance to imperial rule, despite their widely varying constitutional systems, the huge social differences between colonies, and the violent cleavages emerging in most of them.

How did Britain do it? Within the scope of this chapter I can address only a few critical themes, and those quite briefly—the underlying thrust of imperial policy, the interaction between ideology and selected interests within the colonies, and the continuing dilemma of colonial unity within this political environment.

IV

To an overwhelming degree Whitehall's policies grew out of the mid-century cycle of Anglo-French wars. The colonial reforms associated with Lord Halifax and the Board of Trade between 1748 and 1754 began with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle that ended the War of the Austrian Succession. Halifax tried to improve imperial control at a time when unity against France seemed especially necessary. Because nearly all of his policies involved administrative rather than parliamentary decisions and thus had to be implemented through the normal channels of royal government, some colonies welcomed the changes while others ignored or resisted them, but nothing resembling *inter*colonial opposition appeared at all.[37] Still more dramatically, every leading item in the Grenville program of 1763 to 1765—the Proclamation of 1763, the crackdown on smugglers, the Currency Act, the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and the Quartering Act—can be traced to the panicky demands of provincial governors and imperial administrators during Britain's "years of defeat" from 1754 to 1757. Because most of the problems that prompted these demands had worked themselves out by 1763, and because Britain had adopted quite different measures to win the war,

Grenville's program had to seem inappropriate and insulting to the colonists who experienced it. Whitehall quite overlooked the cooperative attitudes engendered by imperial success during the war and opted instead for parliamentary coercion.[38] The settlers eloquently expressed their dissatisfaction by nullifying the Stamp Act. As in seventeenth-century Europe, so also in eighteenth-century North America, warfare remained the primary catalyst to revolutionary change.

The Stamp Act produced a truly unique set of circumstances. Ideology, economic interest, and the heady discovery of colonial unity at both of these levels all combined to generate massive resistance that no one had believed possible even a few months earlier. In fact such a degree of unity was not to recur even in the crisis of 1774 to 1776, for by then loyalists were better organized and far more outspoken. Apart from Rhode Island's Martin Howard, the Stamp Act had no ardent defenders in North America.

For the first time, Parliament had ventured into an area of unenforceable internal legislation so sensitive that all of the mainland colonies instantly felt threatened by it. Recognizing their own powerlessness to avert this catastrophe of taxation without representation and trial without jury, the assemblies could only protest. However, especially after an intercolonial Stamp Act Congress pointed the way, their objections acquired remarkable uniformity. As the assemblies and nearly every pamphleteer quickly recognized, Parliament had ominously polarized imperial and colonial interests but, through its sheer indifference to colonial liberties, had also given the settlers an immense ideological advantage.

What else was the debate over virtual representation about? By smashing the government's chief ideological defense for the Stamp Act, colonial apologists gained a strong moral advantage. Because MPs would pay none of the taxes they imposed on America, the argument went, they could not represent the colonists on this issue even in the

sense that they could normally claim to sit for non-voters in Britain. Acquiescence in the measure, reinforced by British self-interest, would only encourage London to devise others. And because stamp duties adversely affected every articulate interest in the colonies—merchants, seamen, lawyers, clergymen, printers, officeholders, planters, litigious farmers, even gamblers and college students—all could unite to resist the danger on the high constitutional ground of "no taxation without representation."[39] This polarization tormented John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, a man acutely sensitive to both interest and ideology. "What then can we do? Which way shall we turn ourselves? How may we mitigate the miseries of our country?" he asked in 1765. "Great Britain gives us an example to guide us. She teaches us to make a distinction between her interests and our own. Teaches! She requires—commands—insists upon it—threatens—compels—and even distresses us into it."[40]

This fusion of interest and ideology created a sense of colonial unity in 1765 that quite amazed the participants. "Can it come within possibility, that all the individuals in the northern colonies should, without prior conference, minutely concur in sentiment, that the British Parliament cannot, agreeable with the inherent privileges of the colonists, tax them without a representation on their part," asked one newspaper essayist, "unless there was some color for such exception?" Britain might even be able to antagonize the colonies into independence, Dickinson warned William Pitt, and "the Attempt [to leave the Empire] may be executed whenever it is made." "But what, sir, must be the Consequences of that Success?" he added, displaying a skepticism about the viability of America hardly unique to him. "A Multitude of Commonwealths, Crimes, and Calamities, of mutual Jealousies, Hatreds, Wars and Devastations; till at last the exhausted Provinces shall sink into Slavery under the yoke of some fortunate Conqueror. History seems to prove, that this must be the deplorable

Fate of these Colonies whenever they become independent."[41]

The sheer euphoria of united and successful resistance concealed, nevertheless, important structural defects in the emerging patriot cause. First, because the stakes remained fairly low in 1765, a lot of rather conservative men rallied to the colonial cause who would have hesitated had the issue been as drastic as war or independence. In fact, most of the colonists' leading spokesmen in 1765–1766—chiefly men who skillfully employed legal-constitutional arguments rather than Country rhetoric—either became overt loyalists or hedged conspicuously on Independence by 1776. James Otis, Jr., William Smith of New York, John Dickinson, Maurice Moore, Jr., of North Carolina, Daniel Dulany, and John Joachim Zubly all fit one or the other of these categories. In addition former governor Thomas Fitch, author of Connecticut's official pamphlet against the Stamp Act, probably would have made a similar choice had he not died in 1774. The sample is too small to prove anything conclusive, but it does suggest that constitutional arguments alone lacked the moral force to turn someone into a true revolutionary and that radical Country ideology may often have supplied the difference, at least among intellectuals. Yet even William Goddard, who used extreme Country rhetoric against all supporters of the Stamp Act, would be suspected of loyalism by his Baltimore neighbors during the early years of the Revolutionary War.[42]

Secondly, success against the Stamp Act concealed the impotence of the assemblies during the crisis. It also gave patriots undeserved confidence in the efficacy of nonimportation. Lord Rockingham's ministry solicited the support of British merchants against the Stamp Act on December 6, 1765, before word of colonial nonimportation agreements reached London on December 12 and 26. During the slack winter-business season, his government committed itself to repeal in the Commons on January 14, long before

Britain could seriously feel the economic impact of nonimportation. Why? The ministry knew that the Stamp Act had been utterly nullified north of Georgia—that the "mob" had succeeded where assemblies, colonial agents, and merchants had all failed, and that attempted enforcement could easily produce civil war. Although his government divided privately on this question, Rockingham had no intention of accepting such a risk. But because Parliament needed a more dignified reason for retreat than its own incapacity and the activities of American mobs, the government strongly emphasized the imminence of economic disaster in order to slip repeal through the Commons while saving face with the Declaratory Act. The colonists, who knew little about the ministry's sharp disagreements over the Stamp Act, were understandably inclined to accept Parliament's public reasons for repeal as the real ones and hence overvalued the impact of nonimportation in later crises.[43]

Finally, the dramatic success of the American colonists' resistance to the Stamp Act quite simply obscured their failure in challenging the Sugar Act, which also imposed a tax for revenue. Indeed the Rockingham government amended that statute in 1766 to make it even more blatantly a revenue measure, for it now imposed a uniform penny duty on all molasses, British or foreign, imported into America. As the public celebrations finally quieted in 1766, hardly anyone noticed that the first imperial crisis had resolved itself along the traditional power axis of the empire. Parliament emerged victorious over external or oceanic measures, and the settlers over internal affairs. But neither could admit what had happened. Parliament could justify the exercise of any imperial power only by claiming supreme power, or complete sovereignty. The colonists could resist the Stamp Act consistently only by denying the right of Parliament to levy any tax. The empire was already beginning to disintegrate for want of a sustaining theory that could explain convincingly what

Parliament actually could or could not do, what it had or had not done effectively over the previous century.

V

In the next imperial crisis (1767–1770) the settlers extended their resistance from such inland measures as the Stamp Act (or for that matter the older White Pines, Hat, and Iron Acts), where Parliament had never successfully exercised its authority, to oceanic measures where British power was limited only by the efficiency and cost of its enforcement apparatus. Just as the Stamp Act differed from earlier internal legislation in attracting systematic intercolonial resistance on ideological grounds, so the Townshend Revenue Act contrasted with the earlier Molasses Act, which had been evaded locally almost everywhere without appeals to ultimate principle. Since 1763 the activities of the Royal Navy in American waters made smuggling more costly and dangerous.[44] Hence colonial resistance to the Townshend Revenue Act had to be more difficult and structurally more radical than nullification of the Stamp Act had been. This effort jeopardized colonial unity, which remained tenuous at best, and opened troublesome rifts among various interests within and among colonial seaports. It was not particularly successful, and it weakened colonial claims to ideological purity. By 1770, ideology, interest, and the bid for unity simply did not coincide as they had five years before.

The penny duty on molasses, enacted in 1766 with widespread approbation from interested colonial merchants who found it preferable to any other British regulation of molasses since 1733, produced more revenue than all other colonial taxes combined in the prerevolutionary decade.[45] Yet colonial radicals never organized any serious resistance to this measure. Instead the Sons of Liberty united with

merchants and seamen trading to the West Indies, the wine islands, and Southern Europe against the Townshend Revenue Act, which taxed items the colonists could legally obtain only through Britain. Although they were painfully slow in getting organized, merchants who concentrated on commerce elsewhere helped force nonimportation upon those who made a living from direct trade with Britain. "While the importers of Wines, Molasses etc., were pursuing their trade to considerable advantage and paying large sums into the [imperial] Treasury for revenues raised out of those articles," complained a Philadelphia merchant in 1770, "the Importers of British Goods were standing still and sacrificing all for the public good."[46] In many ports this cleavage may often have pitted rising merchants exploiting the expanding new markets that had opened since the 1740s against older, better-established mercantile houses.[47] Apparently the molasses and grain-exporting trades, with their prominent links to distilling, milling, cooperage, shipbuilding, and other occupations, still seemed much too vital to the economic life of colonial cities to sacrifice to the principle of "no taxation without representation." By contrast British importers often used English or Scottish ships, competed directly with colonial artisans, and contributed much less in the form of ancillary employment. Even so, colonial resistance probably created greater hardship in America than it did in Britain, and it disintegrated rapidly when Lord North offered a shadow concession. He repealed the unproductive taxes on lead, glass, and painter's colors and retained the only true revenue producer, the duty on tea.[48]

North's policy shattered organized resistance in 1770 and stimulated savage recriminations among the colonies, but unlike 1766 it produced no real sense of imperial conciliation. Nobody celebrated. Indeed it made a British plot against colonial liberty seem altogether more plausible. If only for this reason the Townshend crisis, more than the Stamp Act controversy, marked a genuine turning point: a hardening of positions, expectations, and political alignments on both sides that would feed directly into the Revolution. Royal government, though stunned and shaken in 1765, had showed strong signs of recuperation by 1767. But in the three years after 1770, incidents that might once have seemed trivial, or at least manageable, paralyzed authority in one colony after another—disagreement over location of the Massachusetts General Court, an unsolved robbery of the East Jersey Treasury, the official fee scale and clergymen's salaries in Maryland and Virginia, paper money in North Carolina, and (a direct offshoot of the Townshend controversy) the Wilkes Fund dispute in South Carolina.[49]

In the midst of this shambles, North's genius soared again. With the Tea Act of 1773 he became the first imperial statesman ever to devise an oceanic measure that could actually be nullified. By restricting the profits to a select few importers, he rallied other merchants against the menace of monopoly. By confining the tea to the East India Company's vessels, he told the Sons of Liberty exactly where to look. They did not have to police the entire waterfront as in 1768–1770. North, by juggling the tea duties in Britain, also managed to reduce the price below that of smuggled tea while retaining the Townshend duty in America, and with it the principle of parliamentary taxation. He got what he deserved, an oceanic version of 1765 culminating in the Boston Tea Party. More ominously, perhaps, ideology now seemed to engulf economic interest at the popular level, for not even the promise of cheap tea could still the angry response.

British indignation at the Boston Tea Party drove the government past enforceable external measures, such as the Boston Port Act, which was implemented with ruthless efficiency, and rushed the ministry into rash internal legislation it could never carry out. The Port Act by itself provoked the First Continental Congress and guaranteed another difficult round of self-imposed commercial sanctions.[50] But the Massachusetts Government Act led directly to war, for not even British bayonets could impose it on the prov-

ince. And the war may have saved the colonies from an extraordinary excess of virtue. Congress, for the first time, interdicted the vital British West Indian trade as part of its strategy of resistance and also announced a delayed policy of nonexportation that would before long adversely affect a majority of settlers in every colony. Britain responded by proscribing all New England trade except that forbidden by Congress, and soon extended the ban to the other colonies. The earlier Townshend Crisis and Jefferson's later embargo both attest to the enormous social dislocations and resentments a policy of this kind would have produced if pursued for very long, especially with Britain applying commercial pressures from the other side. That the colonists "have not Virtue enough to bear it I take for granted," conceded John Adams in October 1775. "How long then will their Virtue last? till next Spring?"[51]

Merchants as a group had probably never been all that vulnerable to ideology, as the willingness of future patriots to pay the molasses duty of 1766 suggests. "Reduce us all to poverty and cut off or wisely restrict that bane of patriotism, Commerce, and we shall soon become Patriots," mused Henry Laurens, who had been driven into opposition mostly by the rapacity of customs officials, "but how hard is it for a rich or covetous Man to enter heartily into the Kingdom of Patriotism."[52] Before the Sugar Act, corruption in the customs service had normally benefited colonial merchants, especially those in the French West Indian trade. But that statute and subsequent regulations deliberately made it more profitable for a customs officer to fleece the merchants than to cheat his own government. Doubtless this traumatic shift did sensitize some merchants to an ideology obsessed with the dangers of corruption. But on the whole, merchants seem to have divided along lines of interest. Existing studies leave many gaps, but a trend is emerging. Older houses, especially those concentrating in direct trade with Britain, mostly went loyalist. Traders to the islands and southern Europe, often new

men, many of whom were building such new cities as Baltimore and Norfolk, sided with the patriots.[53]

Indeed, as war begot Independence in 1775–1776, British importers faced no option beyond what bridge to jump off. If they sided with Britain, the Sons of Liberty would plunder them ashore. If they joined the Revolution, the Royal Navy would destroy them at sea or cut them off from the source of their trade, a fate that did befall James Beekman in New York. Possibly many of them sided with the Crown because their outstanding British contacts gave them unmatched opportunity for royal office—the Hutchinson-Oliver bloc in Massachusetts and the DeLancey family in New York being the most prominent examples. But grain exporters and West Indian traders had greater flexibility. They were far more likely than British importers to own their own ships and, if necessary, they could turn to privateering, an engrossing activity in every port as far south as Baltimore after 1776. Many of these merchants had been dueling with the customs service and the navy for nearly two decades by 1775, for practically every seizure of a colonial vessel I have read about involved one of these trades. For such men and their sailors, the Revolution may have marked only an intensification of an animus already well established. And Independence, including its preliminaries, did extricate them from the awkward constraints of nonexportation provided they could elude the Royal Navy, a task rendered infinitely simpler when London committed the overwhelming bulk of its warships to transporting, supplying, and protecting the army rather than to sustained blockade duty.[54]

VI

Although Bailyn exaggerates the predominance of Country ideology through the 1760s, it had achieved a hugely disproportionate impact by 1775—enough to erode every

legitimate royal and proprietary government on the continent, whether it had been a Court or Country structure, stable or unstable. In times of crisis men turn to the most compelling explanation for their predicament that they can find. As both contestants in the imperial struggle stumbled blindly into self-fulfilling prophecies, the most alarming predictions by colonial radicals became not only plausible but true. In Britain, where every packet ship provided appalling confirmation of the grimmest warnings about colonial Independence, the government did nothing to avert the avalanche. Whitehall never provided colonial moderates with a viable alternative to continued resistance. Hence even genuine conservatives at the First Continental Congress made little effort to block its radical program, and the Second Congress had no choice but to start organizing for a war that had already begun.[55]

While imperial relations had been deteriorating since the previous war, immense social cleavages appeared in one province after another. Because they occurred over a bewildering variety of issues, they had no uniform effect upon the emerging revolutionary cause. Pennsylvania's Paxton Riots, prompted by an Indian war, helped drive the assembly into a demand for royal government that seriously weakened resistance to imperial measures in that colony through the 1760s.[56] When Anglican gentry found amusement by horsewhipping humble Baptist worshippers, they bolstered neither the internal harmony of Virginia nor the cause of united resistance to Britain. Both the Baptist challenge and growing dissatisfaction with county courts indicated that Virginia's traditional pattern of deference had begun to erode.[57] The Regulator movements, at a bare minimum, made later unity against Britain much more difficult, by pitting backcountry planters against lawyers and merchants with powerful tidewater connections in North Carolina, and by turning the backcountry against itself in South Carolina.[58] Similarly New York's land riots of 1776 left the Hudson Valley divided so many ways, socially and politically, that no one has yet sorted out all the trends.[59] In each of these cases, popular upheaval probably impeded more than it furthered the revolutionary cause.

But the Stamp Act riots unquestionably strengthened radical resistance, as did later assaults on customs officials and the Boston Massacre. New Jersey's earlier land riots may also have set the farmers of largely patriot communities against a proprietary clique that would later turn mostly loyalist.[60] No system of social analysis available to the eighteenth century could adequately explain all of these tumults, much less rally all of the dissidents behind a single standard. The classic Court-Country paradigm simply could not account for everything that was happening.

Yet as the empire collapsed, popular resistance to authority did become contagious and soon found new targets. It even threatened patriot notables such as James Bowdoin in Massachusetts, the Livingston clan in New York, James Wilson and Robert Morris in Pennsylvania, and Charles Carroll and the governing élite of Maryland. The overall pattern of upheaval was hardly uniform. At first it merely worried the planter gentry of Virginia and South Carolina, but once the British army appeared in force in these states, it stimulated vertical tensions of a most difficult and dramatic kind.[61]

The challenge to authority engulfed the assemblies as well. In the entire belt of colonies from New York to Maryland, not a single legitimate assembly ever repudiated the empire, and the provincial congresses that rivaled or replaced them in New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were nearly as cautious. Even after Independence, Delaware's convention that drafted its state constitution contained more loyalists than patriots![62] In Massachusetts, where both assembly and provincial congress had set the pace for all other colonies in resistance to Britain, the General Court encountered fierce resistance. The populous eastern towns did not embrace Independence until certain that they could dominate the new state government against

recently aroused western farmers. The interior towns, for their part, refused to accept magistrates elected by eastern majorities or a state constitution drafted by such a legislature. Not even the Constitution of 1780 could resolve this tangle.[63]

Thus, as in the English Civil Wars, the Revolution's most radical phase drove many people well beyond the Country wing of the old Court-Country spectrum. Tom Paine's *Common Sense* savagely ridiculed the entire notion of mixed government. Unicameral legislatures in Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont made little pretense at balancing authority. Even the more orthodox constitutions elsewhere drastically reduced executive powers below the Country norm. The most visible features of this radicalism included the continuing proliferation of extralegal committees and conventions at the local level, the overwhelming repudiation of high colonial officeholders, a dramatic expansion in the size of state legislatures, and a democratization of their membership.[64] The frontal assault on deference that all this turmoil revealed often did little to stabilize public authority. People who found new meaning in repudiating their "betters" had not yet discovered compelling reasons for obeying their equals, even when they happened to be organized as a legislature.

Yet by the time the fighting ended, the war had vastly simplified the prerevolutionary pattern of social tensions. Established churches and religious persecution became increasingly unpatriotic. Great landlords lost much of their power, and easterners made basic concessions to the interior, especially on representation, outside New England. These issues gave way to new ones as inflation, high taxation, and military confiscations worked their effects. By 1780 almost every state was divided geographically, and often vertically, between "cosmopolitans" who were more likely to possess education, wealth, and broad experience with the outside world, and "localists" who lacked these attributes and remained tightly identified with their home villages or counties. State legislatures split along these lines in one roll call after another.[65] With commerce badly disrupted and specie scarce, fiscal questions inevitably became the most explosive issues in this situation. Shays' Rebellion was only the most extensive among many riots of the mid-1780s that protested the imposition of orthodox fiscal systems.[66]

Unlike earlier cleavages, these disputes fit neatly within the old Court-Country paradigm. Whichever end of the spectrum one accepted, the issues seemed obvious. On the Country wing, virtuous farmers struggled desperately to protect their land and hence their independence against a darkly corrupt, grasping, anonymous, pervasive, and mysterious money power, which did indeed threaten their autonomy. On the Court wing, the disciples of public order were merely rallying to defend property and protect the "worthy" against the "licentious."[67]

For by the 1780s beleaguered conservatives, alarmed at the swirl of disorder around them, had finally begun to regroup. To many of them only the techniques of Court politics, overwhelmingly rejected everywhere after 1774, could now meet America's needs. The Continental Army officer corps, in particular, viewed the Revolutionary War primarily as an effort to defeat the British through an efficiently organized American military effort. They and their supporters in Congress (usually a minority) evolved plans for the republic between 1779 and 1783 that would require its transformation into an energetic government with sound finances and a respectable, permanent army. Their demands and their unscrupulous tactics alarmed much of the public who believed, often with considerable grounds, that the British had been defeated by the militia (or "the people") as much as by the Continental Line. Thwarted in 1783 by the Peace of Paris and Washington's unshakable integrity as they toyed dangerously with a military *coup d'état*, the nationalists had to wait another four years for a better opportunity.[68]

Events outside the army did indicate broad popular sup-

port for the more limited of these goals. The impost plans of 1781 and 1783, which would have given Congress an assured revenue for at least a generation, fell just short of the required ratification by all thirteen states. Interestingly, these measures looked toward a division of power between Congress and the states, similar to the old external-internal axis of the empire. Had either proposal succeeded, no constitutional convention would have met in 1787. But both failed, and left a badly demoralized Congress in a mortifying position. Country ideologues such as Jefferson hoped to populate the Northwest Territory with virtuous yeomen who would quickly receive the powers of self-government. After making a start in this direction, Congress reversed itself. Utterly desperate for any income by 1787, the government sold huge chunks of land to speculators at a pittance per acre and restructured territorial government in a manner that closely resembled royal government (appointive governor, council, and judiciary with an elective assembly), even though this status was meant to be temporary. At this point Country principles were rapidly becoming self-destructive, for the government's very weakness drove it to contrary measures.[69]

Something roughly similar was already happening at the state level. In Pennsylvania especially, the Anti-Constitutionalist (or "Republican") Party, many of whose leaders had been part of the old proprietary faction, pieced together an impressive coalition of various minorities alienated by zealous democrats since 1776. Quakers, sectarian Germans, other neutrals, and former loyalists had all been harassed severely during the war and found such an appeal attractive. Because the old élite proved more adept at pluralistic politics than the more radical Constitutionalists, it would soon be strong enough to ratify the Federal Constitution and replace the Pennsylvania Constitution with an orthodox balanced government in 1790, as Georgia had done a year before.[70]

Yet the Federal Constitution was no automatic result of an inexorable trend toward stronger union. No one seemed gloomier about the Confederation's prospects for survival

than committed nationalists, and New England leaders—few of whom in any case showed nationalist sympathies through the 1780s—were already exploring the possibilities of a separate northern confederacy when Shays' Rebellion apparently frightened them off.[71] Convinced that the republic would soon splinter anyway without severe countermeasures, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention took some drastic gambles. From virtually their first moment together, they exceeded their powers by scrapping the Articles of Confederation to consider an entirely new frame of government. In drafting a constitution that would begin to function as soon as nine states had joined the system, they announced their willingness to destroy the Union in order to save it. As of 1787, no one could predict which nine states might ratify or whether a regionally coherent bloc of states might be left outside. In antinationalist New England an initial majority in every state except Connecticut opposed ratification.[72]

Without contending for a nationalist conspiracy or *coup d'état* in 1787, let us nevertheless concede what Beard rather clumsily argued, that the United States Constitution was very much an élitist solution to the problems left by the Revolution and the popular turbulence of the 1780s. In particular its restriction of representatives to one for every thirty thousand people (a figure about twice the size of contemporary Boston) was consciously designed to secure government by "the wise, the rich and the good." Only socially prominent men could expect to be visible enough over that large an area to win elections, and they might well get help from one another. ". . . The great easily form associations," explained a troubled New Yorker in 1788, "the poor and middling class form them with difficulty"—a judgment thoughtfully seconded by William Beers of Connecticut three years later.[73]

In a word, the Federal Constitution shifted the entire spectrum of national politics several degrees to the right. By resolving at last the dilemma of taxation and representation, it gave the new government access to revenues that the

empire had shattered itself trying to establish. It created a splendid opportunity to attempt traditional Court politics on a continental scale. As this sudden challenge forced opponents to gather behind proven Country defenses, more radical alternatives tended to disappear. In such states as New York, Pennsylvania, and—with significant defections from the original Federalist coalition—Virginia as well, the localist-cosmopolitan split of the 1780s, which had also been reflected in the struggle to ratify the Federal Constitution, carried over into the 1790s with strong consistency.[74]

Elsewhere new patterns emerged. New England, which had been the most revolutionary and least nationalist region on the continent through the 1780s and which came close to rejecting the Federal Constitution *en bloc,* shifted stunningly to become the bastion of nationalist Court politics. The Southern states, generally regarded as fairly conservative during the Revolution, became the regional home of Country principles and Jeffersonian Republicanism, once coastal South Carolina got far enough away from its traumatic wartime experiences to join its neighbors. The Middle States remained, as before, the primary battleground between the other two regions. For the various state élites had always split into sectional alignments in the Continental Congress, and they would once again as soon as the new Constitution went into force.[75]

In other words, although the context was now quite different, the 1790s did mark something of a reversion to pre-1763 patterns of provincial politics. Court techniques again appealed to New England (even to Connecticut and Rhode Island), the South strongly embraced Country principles, and the Middle States could go either way.

VII

Implicit divisions among the Founding Fathers became overt in the 1790s. Above all, they divided over the significance of American Independence. To Alexander Hamilton and his Federalist followers, Independence freed America to become another Great Britain. A successful American Revolution would mean, they believed, that the United States ought to duplicate England's Revolution Settlement within minimal republican constraints. The implications of this position went far beyond politics, for presumably the United States would develop through time much as Britain had, generating a modern, integrated manufacturing economy. Fittingly perhaps, the Federalists' Anglophilia (or "Anglomania," according to their enemies) alienated every major ethnic minority in the republic within a decade, except the Hudson Valley Dutch and probably the sect Germans of Pennsylvania. By 1800 Federalists received their most assured support from old-stock English voters, chiefly in traditional communities with a slow rate of growth. Because the fastest-growing areas of the country produced and marketed primarily agricultural surpluses, this pattern is not at all as contradictory as it may at first appear.[76]

In rapid succession the Hamiltonians adopted measures that fulfilled the worst prophecies of the antifederalists of 1788, most of whom outside New England now rallied behind Madison and Jefferson in opposition. Their deepest concerns also transcended politics. Their vision of the republic saw it expanding through space across the continent while remaining economically and socially at roughly its current stage. With the stakes so momentous, the most consistent position for such a coalition to assume would have been that of an *anti*-Constitution party such as had emerged in Pennsylvania after 1776 and which was pretty much the role Federalists hoped to condemn them to. Instead, led by men who had supported ratification, they assumed the stance of a traditional English Country opposition. They denounced the Federalists for corrupting and perverting an ideally balanced government. This almost instant espousal of strict construction probably contributed more than any other single factor to the rapid legitimation of the new docu-

ment. Federalists claimed to be implementing it, and Republicans insisted that they were defending it against Federalist excesses. Nobody opposed it. As just about everybody realized right away, the contending regions and interests had all surrendered as much as they dared in the compromises of 1787. The only alternative to the Constitution had already become disunion, a disintegration of the federal republic into its components, rather than experimentation with different systems such as the French could afford to try in the same decade. The continuing unity and viability of the United States depended, ironically, upon its ability to replicate both sides of the central tensions that had afflicted Augustan England.[77]

To Madison, Jefferson, and most committed Republicans, this stance came easily and naturally, for whether they had supported or opposed the Constitution, they instantly recognized Hamilton's policy for what it was. To them Independence meant an almost miraculous opportunity to remain different from and more "virtuous" than Britain. Anything else had to be what they called "corruption," and what the French were about to define as "counterrevolutionary." Like an English Country opposition, at least on political and economic questions, they idealized the past more than the future and feared significant change, especially major economic change, as corruption and degeneration. Huge cities and large-scale manufacturing, especially of luxury items for export, would transform virtuous yeomen into demoralized laborers and thus undermine the very foundations of republicanism. On the other hand, Jeffersonians strongly favored small household manufactures which had no such evil effects and which could significantly reduce America's dependence upon foreign imports.[78] But beyond the political and economic sphere, the parallel with Augustan England does break down. In America's own "battle of the books" during the Federal era, nobody exceeded High Federalists in shrill denunciation of all deviation from classical standards.[79] Not inappropriately, perhaps, Federalists apparently associated

theological, literary, and artistic change with political assaults upon the existing social order.

We are now prepared to evaluate America's Revolution Settlement. To an almost incredible degree, American events after 1789 mimicked or even repeated English developments of a century before. America's Revolution Settlement resembles the remake of an old movie classic, except that the new producer has altered the ending to suit the changing tastes of his audience.

Note first the striking similarities. Each Revolution bequeathed intense, brutal party conflict to the next generation, a struggle that mobilized unprecedented numbers of voters, only to yield to a period of one-party rule—the Whig Oligarchy in Britain, the Era of Good Feelings in America. In both cases, because nobody really believed in parties, the contenders sought to destroy or at least absorb one another, not to perpetuate some kind of "party system." The division between Whig and Tory in Britain closely parallels the split between Federalists and Republicans in the United States, with Hamilton assuming the role of Junto Whigs or Walpole, and Jefferson serving as Tory or "Country" gentry —better still, as the "patriot" opposition to Walpole that had united Tories with Real Whigs in the 1730s; for Jefferson took his nomenclature from the late seventeenth century and would have hated to be called a Tory.

Indeed virtually all of England's central issues reappeared in America once Hamilton and his admirers launched their own financial revolution in the 1790s—an overt response to unresolved problems from the Revolutionary War. Hamilton took a debt that had sunk, depending upon the type of security and the provisions individual states had made for redemption, to anywhere from ten to thirty cents on the dollar and funded it at par, creating some of the grosser windfall profits in American history.[80] Nearly all of this gain went to speculators rather than exsoldiers or planters, as entrepreneurs from New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore raced through the Southern backcountry to buy

every available security before the local inhabitants (including local speculators) could learn how valuable they were.[81] Thus many Southerners saw only losses for themselves in these arrangements, and New York's Clintonian faction, which had already been forced to surrender lucrative port duties to the new government, was not won over, despite the state's gains. But Hamilton's assumption of state debts meant an immense flow of capital into New England and Pennsylvania, sharply reducing the need for direct taxes there and instantly lowering political temperatures. Certainly for New England, Court politics on a national scale worked wonders that had been utterly impossible when attempted at the state level in the 1780s.[82]

In 1791 Hamilton chartered the Bank of the United States, America's direct copy of the Bank of England. In place of England's great recoinage of the 1690s, the United States government established its own coinage and persuaded "the American Newton," David Rittenhouse, to take charge of the mint, a task Sir Isaac had accepted a century before.[83] Not surprisingly, the New York Stock Exchange also dates from the 1790s, doubtless contributing to a "projecting spirit" that far exceeded anything Defoe's generation had known. By 1792 the speculations of Hamilton's associate, William Duer, had produced the republic's first financial panic. "The stock buyers count him out," complained Jefferson, "and the credit and fate of the nation seem to hang on the desperate throws and plunges of gambling scoundrels."[84] "No man of reflection, who had ever attended to the South Sea Bubble, in England, or that of [John] Law in France, and who applied the lessons of the past to the present time," he added in another letter, "could fail to foresee the issue tho' he might not calculate the moment at which it would happen." The national debt, he admitted, had to be paid. Indeed, unlike Hamilton, he was determined to pay it off as rapidly as possible and end the government's dependence upon the financial community. "But all that stuff called scrip, of whatever description, was folly

or roguery, and yet, under a resemblance to genuine public paper, it buoyed itself up to a par with that. It has been a severe lesson: yet such is the public cullability [*sic*] in the hands of cunning & unprincipled men, that it is doomed by nature to receive these lessons once in an age at least."[85]

No mere panic could restrain the "projecting spirit" set loose in the 1790s. Led by Eli Whitney's cotton gin and Robert Fulton's steamboat, the number of federal patents nearly doubled in every five-year period from 1790 through 1814. By 1802 it had reached a level thrice England's peak of the 1690s, which, incidentally, rested on a population base that was nearly identical: 5.5 million people.[86] Similarly the number of American banks exploded from four in 1791 to 29 by 1800, 89 in 1811 when the Bank of the United States expired, 246 by 1816, and over 300 at the onset of the Panic of 1819.[87] Oceanic commerce, mostly stagnant since 1774, grew at an astounding rate. America's $20 million worth of exports in 1790 had multiplied more than five times by 1807, led by the nation's reexport trade as the world's only major neutral carrier after 1793. An even more solid achievement, because it did not rest on European wartime conditions, was the fourfold increase in shipping engaged in coastal and internal trade—about double the rate of population growth. Indeed shipping profited enormously from the overall boom. In 1790 American vessels controlled only 40 percent of the value of American imports and exports. Just six years later this figure had leapt to 92 percent. The tonnage of American registered bottoms tripled between 1790 and 1810, approaching two-thirds of Britain's on a much smaller population base, while American shipbuilding may have roughly equaled the entire British empire's between 1800 and Jefferson's embargo of late 1807.[88] Frantic expansion of this sort created unprecedented extremes of wealth and soon stimulated great concern among the upper and middle classes about the problem of the poor.[89]

Other similarities abound. In every crisis with Indians

or foreign powers in the 1790s, Federalists inched the government closer to the statist model first articulated by Continental officers and investors in the critical war years, 1779–1783.[90] For a time the leverage provided by the debt gave Hamilton a virtual placeman system for controlling Congress under a "prime minister"—creating, in effect, a national faction such as Madison thought he had rendered impossible in the persuasive argument of *Federalist Number 10*. Through the whiskey excise Hamilton hoped to establish beyond question the government's power to tax internally. This Court measure provoked a rebellion in western Pennsylvania within a few years. As the republic verged on war with France, the Federalists extended their imitation of England with the stamp and land taxes of 1798, the second of which touched off Fries' Rebellion in 1799. Federalist repression of this mild and rather comic outburst, combined with the virulent nativism of the government's policy toward aliens, rapidly drove church Germans over to the opposition and forever alienated Pennsylvania from the party of Washington, Hamilton, and John Adams.[91] Hamilton closely supervised the creation of a true standing army at the end of the decade, and Congress added a navy designed to win respect for American merchant vessels on the high seas.[92] Especially after the Jay Treaty, Federalists pursued a pro-British and anti-French foreign policy, partly because the funding program depended for its solvency upon customs duties derived from British trade. (On the other hand, the Federalists, far more than their opponents, took serious steps to limit this dependence by attempting to develop internal revenues as a partial alternative.) Jeffersonians, most of them sincere admirers of the French Revolution, took the opposite approach on these questions. Yet as the new army, the Sedition Act, hysterical nativism, and the threat of electoral reform to guarantee a federalist presidential succession in 1800 all revealed, Hamiltonian statism possessed a high potential for coercing dissent, which Federalists honestly equated with disloyalty.

In their hierarchy of political values, liberty and equality had become subordinate to public order and energetic government.[93]

For that matter, just as Whigs and Tories agreed after 1689 that violent protest was no longer acceptable politics, so Federalists and probably a large majority of Republicans accepted Washington's argument that once a government had been validly established by popular consent, it could be changed only by peaceful means. But in America each party still applauded the violent resistance of the Revolutionary War, unlike England where the Civil Wars seemed indecently excessive to virtually the entire governing class by 1689. In this sense, whiskey rebels and others with similar ideas still had a viable tradition to invoke. Yet on balance the similarities with England appear to outweigh the differences even on this issue.[94]

Nevertheless the two Revolutions came out so differently that the result, to steal a phrase from R. R. Palmer, might well be called America's "Great Inversion" of England's Revolution Settlement. The Court won in England, and the Country in America. Surely one reason was the contrasting pattern of international involvement. While Britain warred with France in all but six years from 1689 to 1714, the United States remained at peace in all but six years from 1789 to 1815 (if we omit Indian conflicts from the comparison). When the republic did go to war, many of the pressures that had transformed England after 1689 appeared instantly in America: an enlarged army, a small but proficient navy, and internal revenues during the quasi-war with France. All of these devices plus improved coastal defenses and a new Bank of the United States reappeared during or immediately following the War of 1812.

But because America's political antagonisms had a strong sectional base, protracted war with any great power would almost certainly have destroyed the fragile Union long before it could have transformed itself into a modern state, which, in the world of 1800, meant above all a government

able to fight other governments effectively for an indefinite period. Even more than Englishmen of 1700, Americans could not agree on who their natural enemy was, or, as Washington stressed with peculiar force in his Farewell Address, whether they had one at all. Southern planters, who resented their continuing colonial dependence on British markets for their staples, often did regard Britain as a natural enemy. So did West Indian export merchants in the 1790s when the British took to plundering American vessels in the Caribbean, while merchants specializing in British imports completed this revival of the pattern of 1769 by opposing commercial sanctions and rallying to neutrality and the Jay mission.[96] Yankees, on the other hand, responded similarly to the prospect of war with France. Resurrecting ancestral memories of the traumatic struggles along New England's borders from 1689 to 1763, they evidently still did regard the French as natural enemies, a popish people doomed either to Jacobin anarchy or, especially after the rise of Napoleon, to slavish government.

Thus any major war mobilized hostile interests quite capable of paralyzing the government. Conflict with France soon generated threats of nullification and even disunion in the Anglophobic South after 1798. War with Britain provoked an overt danger of secession in Francophobic New England by 1814. A timely peace defused the crisis in each case. Yet in a real sense Americans could agree to live together only so long as they did not have to experience or share the pressures inevitably associated with a modern central government, and even that minimal understanding was to collapse by 1861.

Two other differences between Augustan England and federal America help to explain the political contrast. The first point is impressionistic but probably accurate, although its dimensions remain uncertain. Compared with England, the United States simply lacked a national governing class, that is, one that had intermarried across state boundaries.

The Revolution, and particularly the resulting comradeship among Continental Line officers, undoubtedly stimulated something of the kind, later perpetuated in the Society of the Cincinnati; and while the national capital remained in Philadelphia in the 1790s, High Federalists did everything they could socially to act like a true governing class. But relatively few New Englanders seem to have married outside their region, and while the phenomenon was more common elsewhere, it required—almost by definition—more than a generation for the effects to be felt.[97]

The final contrast may well outweigh the others. By 1700 England had certainly acquired an integrated economy with London at its center, but the United States would achieve nothing fully comparable until the generation after 1815 or even 1840. The Revolution reversed the prevailing trend toward improved, imperial economic efficiency without creating a national, American economy. Many parts of the republic, awkwardly enough, still traded more with the former empire than with the rest of the Union. American vessels (not American produce) were now excluded from the British West Indies, and where about a third of the empire's ships (but not a third of its tonnage) had been built in the colonies as of 1774, Britain now preferred to construct her own at significantly greater cost. American shipbuilding recovered only in the 1790s, mostly as a byproduct of European war. Similarly the Mediterranean trade, a rapidly expanding sector before Lexington, utterly collapsed for a quarter-century because American vessels had no navy to protect them from Barbary pirates. The sheer uncertainties of these years, and not the solidity of economic opportunity in the new republic, probably explain the appearance of economic scramblers like William Duer, riding a spectacular cycle from boom to bust. Because imports from Britain, mostly in British ships, did revive after the Revolution, beginning with the famous glut of 1783–1784, the overall pattern seemed ironic in the extreme until perhaps

1793. The mercantile heirs of the loyalists, primarily British importers and overwhelmingly Federalist politically, appeared to be doing much better than merchants who concentrated in areas that patriots had once dominated. From this perspective, if the Revolution really was fundamentally an economic movement, somebody had miscalculated rather badly.[98]

To be sure, coastal and internal trade expanded more rapidly than American exports (not counting reexports). The margin was about 3:2 from 1790 to 1807 and much more decisive thereafter until war disrupted everything. By 1820 intra-American trade would finally catch up with American foreign trade. And in the decades 1790 to 1810, greater New York City displayed unmistakable signs of its rapid emergence as the continent's center of communications. But as a central city it still could not compare with London, even the London of 1700. As of the War of 1812, the United States was still a less efficient and less integrated economic entity than the old empire had been. By the time this situation began to change in the generation after 1815, the political configuration of the republic had already been defined in a way that excluded the British Court option.[99]

Thus the results of the two Revolutions differed markedly. In Britain the Court Whigs won and kept central control over the new Hanoverian dynasty, Parliament, the debt, the bank, high finance, the major corporations, the army, the navy, the bureaucracy, and the vast network of patronage. In the United States the Country opposition of Thomas Jefferson, which defined its aspirations very much in classic British terms, captured the central government in 1801 and held it. Compared with the Tory revival in Britain a century before, which had regained control of Parliament and the ministry in the last years of Anne's reign, the later Federalist resurgence that fell only one state short of retaking the presidency in 1812 was a less spectacular threat. And as a national force, Federalists disintegrated much more rapidly after 1815 than British Tories had after 1714.[100]

VIII

Yet Federalists and Republicans were not mere shadows of earlier Whigs and Tories, duelling awkwardly after 1789 in the sunrise of Europe's new revolutionary age. The American parties showed much fainter tendencies to shift polarities in the course of their struggles, even after the Republicans gained power and the Federalists found themselves in the uncongenial role of a permanent opposition. Both overwhelmingly rejected hereditary monarchy, although they differed considerably over how broadly they construed this repudiation. The etiquette Hamilton devised for President Washington strongly evoked monarchical traditions, his opponents nervously objected, while John Adams' passionate campaign for titles in 1789 and his insistence that functionally the Constitution really had created a monarchy caused him no end of polemical discomfort.[101] To suspicious Republicans, the Federalists seemed to give their dark secret away whenever John Allen and Uriah Tracy, two avowed monarchists from the unlikely state of Connecticut where not even appointive governors had ever taken root, opened their sarcastic and vituperative mouths. Convinced that "the herd have begun to walk on their hind legs," Tracy raged that "it was a damned farce to suppose that a republican government could exist," and that even America must finally have its own aristocracy and king.[102]

As in England, however, each party had discernible Court and Country wings, the normal results of frantic coalition building in time of stress. Among the Federalists, Allen and Tracy represented the extreme, not the norm. But Hamilton's policies explicitly emulated English Court techniques, and on the whole John Adams, the unyielding Country ideologue of 1775, agreed with him. Although he never abandoned his hostility to standing armies, Adams endorsed funding, assumption, the Bank, the Jay mission and treaty, and at first greatly admired Hamilton. "The Secretary of the Treasury is so able, and has done so well,"

he wrote in 1791, "that I have scarcely permitted myself to think very closely whether he could or could not have done better," although he did believe that Hamilton should have pushed harder for internal revenues. Adams found speculation deplorable but inevitable. "The funding system is the hair shirt which our sinful country must wear as a propitiation for her past dishonesty," he explained. "The only way to get rid of speculation is to hasten the rise of our stocks to the standard beyond which they cannot ascend." Fear of disunion and disorder now outweighed the dangers of malignant power that had tormented him in the 1770s. "The rivalries already arisen between the State Sovereignties and the National Sovereignty, and the other rivalries which if not already in action, will soon appear between Ministers of State and between the Legislative, executive and judicial powers give me more serious apprehension, than National Debt, Indian Wars and Algerine depredations"—that is, the three issues out of which a national bureaucracy, army, navy, and their accompanying patronage already seemed likely to emerge.[103] Eventually, of course, Adams and Hamilton did split, mostly over the army issue after 1798. Yet even in the 1790s some Federalists opposed each Hamiltonian measure, sometimes on explicit "Country" grounds. Once out of power, a few of them could develop these themes more fully, as when Senator Isaac Tichenor of Vermont fumed against James Monroe—of all people—for overlavish support of a standing army during the War of 1812. On the whole, however, the rarity of such defections is far more striking. Although younger Federalists copied Republican styles of mass politics, they held strongly to their old policies. In 1811 they voted unanimously to recharter the Bank which, despite the administration's support, died at Republican hands.[104]

More fascinating are tensions among the Republicans. In several respects Republican attitudes, like popular upheaval during the Revolution, strayed past the accepted boundaries of Country ideology. Republicans often extended to any

navy the kind of rhetoric aimed at a standing army in England, where Country thinkers saw the navy as a politically safe *alternative* to larger armies. When Republicans extended the suffrage beyond property holders, they clearly outran neo-Harringtonian prescriptions, but this trend—common among northern Republicans by 1800 or so—did not become widespread in the more orthodox South until the Jacksonian era.[105] Similarly when radical Republicans fought to repudiate English common law for simplified codes or digests, they attacked a major prop to Country ideology in England and hence rang alarm bells through their own party. The Sedition Act of 1798 persuaded virtually all Republicans that no such thing as a common-law crime should exist under federal jurisdiction.[106] But at the state level moderate Republicans combined successfully almost everywhere with Federalists to protect common law.[107] Even Jefferson, who at times could sound quite radical on this theme, retreated hastily when confronted with an ominously viable alternative—French civil law in Louisiana.[108]

This issue aside, Jefferson fits the specifications for a Country ideologue almost perfectly. Country terminology happily avoids the muddle Jeffersonian scholars usually get into when they worry about whether, or how and why, an "agrarian" like Jefferson could advocate commercial expansion and internal improvements of so many different kinds, including "manufacturing" after 1807. Evidently he was not really an "agrarian" after all.[109] But as Pocock and McCoy have shown, Country thinkers believed that commerce was a basic civilizing force and that the exchange of agricultural surpluses for other necessities strengthened the economic viability of the virtuous landowner. They were indeed suspicious of immense cities, of luxuries which might "effeminate" virtuous and "manly" qualities, and of the money power by which people who did no work and performed no visible useful function got rich at someone else's expense. Confined to the household level, manufactures

were acceptably virtuous. Jefferson matches the model on all these points, even if his deep Anglophobia inclined him to quote Scots more often than Englishmen.[110]

Jefferson agreed that the Revolutionary War debt had to be paid, but he loathed funding systems and the very idea of a permanent debt. To redeem this obligation, his "wise and frugal government" had to spend less than it received. Always fearful of banks, he tried to prevent the chartering of the Bank of the United States in 1791, and after it expired he attempted to prove with logarithms in 1813 that the republic could not afford banks.[111] Speculative booms and busts appalled him and made him tremble for the nation's future, whether in 1792 or 1819.[112] He opposed any standing army beyond a decentralized, frontier, constabulary force, although he did support the West Point Academy as a place through which its officers could be rotated to learn the technical side of their trade.[113] Like English Country spokesmen, he favored a navy if only to regain for America's agricultural surpluses the world markets that the Revolution had closed. Thus he launched the Barbary War to keep open the newly revived Mediterranean trade.[114] Only with assured overseas markets could the United States remain agricultural, prosperous, and free of undue dependence upon British credit and buyers.

Madison and Gallatin shared most of these values. Madison was less given to rhetoric about the tree of liberty and the blood of tyrants, and as an author of *The Federalist,* perhaps more inclined to praise public order. Although he and Gallatin reconciled themselves to the Bank in a way that Jefferson never did, Madison's economics involved the same concern—to protect America's agricultural surpluses by making the rest of the world bid for them competitively. He and Gallatin seemed more skeptical than Jefferson about the navy. Could the United States afford one large enough to make a real difference? Indeed for Gallatin, retirement of the debt overruled almost all other considerations and strongly reinforced his deep antimilitarist beliefs. Only when the government had an assured surplus revenue should it start to think seriously about fleets and internal improvements. Madison did agree with Hamilton that population pressure would eventually force the United States to follow the economic pattern of Europe —sprawling cities, huge manufactures, and the network of social dependencies that these phenomena involved. But while Hamilton's policies tried to hasten this trend in the interests of national strength, Madison—much to Hamilton's surprise—struggled to postpone the evil day in the name of republican virtue.[115]

Nevertheless the Jeffersonians did attract a number of "Court" Republicans, defined here as men whose social and economic values resembled Hamilton's much more closely than Jefferson's, Madison's, or Gallatin's. General Samuel Smith of Baltimore—wealthy merchant, Revolutionary War hero, and strong advocate of the Federal Constitution—entered Congress as a Hamiltonian. "Gentlemen might speak of equality," he scoffed in an early speech, "but in practice the thing was impossible." Yet he soon went over to the opposition when the Washington administration did nothing to protect his ships against British depredations in the Caribbean. Always a bit contemptuous of Jefferson's idealism and Madison's policies, he vainly tried to arrange an accord between Jefferson and Adams in 1800. Although he rarely got his way with the administration on commercial policy after 1801, his brother did become Jefferson's Secretary of the Navy, and Samuel did serve in a frustrating role as the administration's chief link with the merchant community.[116] Jacob Crowninshield, a Salem merchant who made his fortune after 1790 in the Far Eastern and Continental European trades, had acquired a strong dislike for the British during the course of doing so. Quite logically, his experience and attitude brought him into the Republican Party.[117] Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts followed a more tortuous path from antifederalist with a keen distrust of the people in 1787–1788 (the people of New England,

he told the Philadelphia Convention, "have . . . the wildest ideas of Government in the world"), to Hamiltonian with an anti-Southern bias a few years later, to Adams Federalist, to Jeffersonian. Like Smith, he hoped Jefferson would acquiesce in Adams' reelection in 1800, in exchange for the succession in 1804.[118] John Armstrong's strange career led him from authorship of the extremely inflammatory Newburgh broadsides in 1783 to the secretaryship of war in Madison's cabinet.[119] In New York the Clintonian, Livingston, and Burr factions all had conspicuous entrepreneurial elements that would make possible a coalition of moderate Republicans and Federalists against Madison's reelection in 1812.[120]

Whatever Burr's famous conspiracy was really about, one element of it represented the ultimate danger to liberty in Country terms. Burr actively tried to subvert the officer corps of both navy and army, and he did bring the army's commanding general, James Wilkinson, into his scheme. Despite his killing of Hamilton, he apparently had considerable Federalist support. Emphasizing "the weakness and imbecility of the federal government" under Jefferson, Burr boasted to one potential recruit "that with two hundred men, he could drive Congress with the president at its head into the river Potomac" and "that with five hundred men, he could take possession of New York." Wilkinson tried to win over a reluctant major by arguing "that the very existence of an army and democracy was incompatible; that Republics were ungrateful; jealous of armies and military merit; and made no provision for the superannuated and worn out officers . . . who were left to starve." The major stayed out of the conspiracy, but he agreed with the general's opinion. Interestingly, in the cypher used between Burr and Wilkinson, 76 meant "democracy," 89 stood for "aristocracy," and 96 represented the navy.[121]

Pennsylvania produced a small but active group of Court Republicans. Merchants and manufacturers such as Tench Coxe, John Nicholson, John Swanwick, Charles Pettit, and

Blair McCleanachan, plus the able lawyer Daniel Cunyngham Clymer, entered the 1790s either as overt Hamiltonians or with principles difficult to distinguish from Hamilton's, but each of these men eventually defected to the Republicans. Their motives varied from dissatisfaction with the funding program (Pettit and McCleanachan demanded even better terms for security holders), to an interest in manufacturing with Anglophobic implications that Hamilton did not share (Coxe and possibly Nicholson), to ethnic and social resentment against Federalist snobbery (McClenachan again, and Swanwick). Quite a rarity among Jeffersonians, Coxe had been a loyalist during the Revolution, while Swanwick was the son of a British placeman and loyalist. Swanwick also entered public life while a younger member in the mercantile firm of Robert Morris, "financier of the Revolution" and arch-Federalist.[122] As Federalism rapidly collapsed in Pennsylvania after 1800, such men often found themselves working with Federalists against radical Republicans, such as Michael Leib. Yet moderate Republicans always remained in command. Their support of Madison made the difference in his reelection in 1812.

The Court-Country paradigm heavily colored nearly all participants' perceptions of the issues and personalities of the era. The political rhetoric of the age implicitly assumed a spectrum of possibilities from an extreme Court position on the right, through Hamiltonianism, then various stages of moderation in the middle, then a pure Country position on the left, and on to radical Jacobinism (most evident, perhaps, in Pennsylvania) as a new option on the extreme left. Wherever one stood on this spectrum, he was likely to suspect anyone to his right of sinister conspiracies against liberty. Hamilton so accused Burr, Adams attacked Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison indicted Adams, John Randolph and the Quids denounced Madison, and Michael Leib raged against Gallatin in these terms. Conversely, everybody to one's left had to be flirting with disorder and anarchy. High Federalists never quite trusted John Adams, for they re-

membered his radicalism of the 1770s. Jefferson, of course, was to them a hopeless demagogue. For example, even after four years of mild Republican rule, Fisher Ames still expected a dawning age of democratic terror. "Our days are made heavy with the pressure of anxiety, and our nights restless with visions of horror," he groaned in the placid year of 1805. "We listen to the clank of chains, and overhear the whispers of assassins. We mark the barbarous dissonance of mingled rage and triumph in the yell of an infatuated mob; we see the dismal glare of their burnings and scent the loathsome steam of human victims offered in sacrifice." Even a brief glimpse of reality only drove him to deeper despair, for as he confessed in the same essay, "there are not many, perhaps not five hundred even among the federalists, who yet allow themselves to view the progress of licentiousness as so speedy, so sure, and so fatal, as the deplorable experience of our country shows that it is. . . ."[123] Somewhat more genially, the moderate Republican governor of Pennsylvania, Thomas McKean, remarked of the radicals: "who is there to control the wanton passions of men, suddenly raised to power and frisking in the pasture of true liberty, yet not sufficiently secured by proper barriers?"[124] Even when they went past conventional Country positions, men still used the rhetoric. Opponents of common law attacked its malignant corruptions. Many Republicans denounced a navy with arguments borrowed from the classic controversy over standing armies.

Yet when they faced one another, Federalists and Republicans accurately recognized what were basically Court and Country coalitions, respectively. Both parties also understood that westward expansion and the continuing immigration of non-English elements strongly favored the Republicans over the Federalists. But only when their own position had become quite hopeless did Federalists seriously try to exploit the Republicans' most conspicuous weakness —African slavery.[125]

Although most American historians like to boast that

Federalists and Republicans created the world's first example of a modern party system, Ronald Formisano, a close student of the "second American party system," has challenged this view. To him the contest between Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians embodied the antiparty deferential values of the eighteenth century more than it anticipated the mass parties of the 1840s. Federalist decline was so rapid and complete that no "system" ever existed for very long, and in any case, state and national politics were far from integrated along party lines.[126] However we define the threshold that permits use of the term "party system," these strictures, by emphasizing the underlying similarities between Augustan Britain and Federalist-Jeffersonian America, nicely support a central argument of this chapter.

Finally, did Republicans really take on Federalist traits after 1801 until by 1816 they "out-Federalized the Federalists"? Did the responsibilities of power turn the Country into the Court? Did Republicans switch positions much as English Whigs had a century before? Certainly the "Old Republicans" (or "Quids") who prided themselves on faithfulness to "the principles of '98" believed that too much of Hamilton had sneaked inside Jefferson, and historians since Henry Adams have found the theme equally attractive. To be sure, Jefferson was not as radical after 1801 as some of his earlier pronouncements had hinted he might be. Much to Gallatin's relief, he did not interfere with the Bank. Although he and Madison had questioned the value and desirability of the burgeoning reexport trade in the 1790s, they decided to defend it when it came under British attack after 1806. But they resorted to the more drastic embargo, rich as it was in Revolutionary precedents, only when Britain challenged American access to European markets for agricultural products.[127] Yet in 1816 Republicans did enact a second Bank of the United States and the nation's first protective tariff, while Madison vetoed an internal improvements bill solely on constitutional grounds.

Still, the argument is fairly weak. Even after 1816 Re-

publicans differed from their antagonists far more than they resembled them.[128] Before 1812 and again after 1816, they worked consistently and successfully to pay off the national debt, a commitment that would survive in American politics until World War II. All internal taxes were repealed as soon as possible, another legacy that endured into the present century. The army and navy were again reduced to prewar size. Even during the War of 1812 Madison's government attempted none of the repressive measures that Federalists had inflicted upon Republicans in 1798. More than any other single factor, the regional lopsidedness of the two parties tended to keep both safely within their respective traditions.

The very success of Republicans in assimilating ex-Federalists did attract alien souls to the coalition, including for the first time a powerful Northern element committed to heavy manufactures. Yet the Tariff of 1816 was designed merely as a temporary response to British dumping tactics and, in any case, had little Southern support—almost none by 1820.[129] As early as 1813 Jefferson complained "that in proportion as avarice and corruption advance on us from the north and east, the principles of free government are to retire to the agricultural states of the south and west, as their last asylum and bulwark."[130] Momentarily he seemed correct, but the pattern did not take hold. Occasional deviations aside, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian government held amazingly steadfast in protecting its virtue from the corrupting influences of economic modernity. By the 1830s things had been righted once again, and the most commercial elements began to organize separately as National Republicans before they finally emerged as the Whig Party. Jackson dismantled the Bank, and South Carolina the tariff. In one state legislature after another, Democrats displayed their suspicion of corporations, America's over-mighty subjects. In New York City, men of truly great wealth gathered almost unanimously under the Whig banner by 1840.[131] The United States became in the 1830s the only country in

the world that I know of to repay its entire national debt and then fret virtuously about how to spend, or not spend, its surplus revenue.

Similarly the federal government remained minuscule, a midget institution in a giant land. It had almost no internal functions except the postal system and the sale of western lands. Its role scarcely went beyond what would have pleased even most Antifederalists in the 1780s, the use of port duties and the revenue from land sales to meet its own limited expenses. Thus when the Adams administration occupied Washington, D.C. for the first time in 1800, congressmen and senators physically outnumbered executive officials and clerks combined! This ratio slipped very little over the next thirty years.[132] The American army of five to ten thousand men held fast at a level roughly comparable to Charles II's weak force, even though by 1830 the population of the United States would be double that of England in the 1680s, and the difference in per capita wealth must have been much greater. To take a guess, the American navy may not have exceeded the strength of the Tudor fleet of three centuries earlier, despite the fantastic growth of commercial shipping after 1790.[133]

Can we explain this contrast by defining the United States as naturally a "Country" society, so committed to the principles of English opposition ideology that alternatives were scarcely conceivable, much less attainable?[134] Court principles as we have seen, did take root as far south as Maryland in the provincial era, and after a devastating setback in the Revolution, they reappeared in the 1780s and, in the next decade, came amazingly close to defining the new government's character for an indefinite future. Without the French Revolution, which gave Republicans the leverage to organize voters on an unprecedented scale and take possession of Pennsylvania and New York, Federalists might have triumphed even while outnumbered. After all, England's natural majority, the Tories, managed to lose to the Whigs by 1714. At this level the consensus

school has a compelling point to make, for a broader electorate than Britain's, organized into nearly equal districts and constantly stimulated by westward expansion and immigration, gave the French example something to work with and thus contributed decisively to Jefferson's "Revolution of 1800."[135]

But at another level the vital difference between Britain and America was not so much the voting population or even ethnic and religious pluralism, but the South. From this perspective, Country principles did become inseparable from American politics after the titanic battles of the 1790s, not because everybody shared them, but because they overwhelmingly characterized a region that established something close to political hegemony within the republic after 1801. Had the Union begun and ended north of the Potomac, Federalists probably could have created a variant of Britain in America, with themselves as a genuine ruling class presiding over a modernizing economy. And American politics would then have acquired a more overt class basis. But slaveholding planters, by dominating the federal government without serious interruption from 1801 to 1861, made regional Country principles into national political practices until the party of Lincoln emerged to threaten everything they cherished. In response they tried to withdraw into a smaller union that could sustain their system, but were smashed into submission by invading armies from the industrial North. Even then, whenever the South remained free to function openly in national politics, it severely limited Northern options. A united South could still tip the balance in a closely divided North. To take only the most conspicuous example, no incumbent Northern president ever won reelection until William McKinley in 1900, except Lincoln while the South was out of the Union, and Grant with the aid of Reconstruction governments and votes. No incumbent Southerner ever failed to gain reelection until John Tyler was repudiated by his own party in 1844 and James K. Polk chose not to run again

four years later. The decision of 1800 had enduring effects for a full century of presidential politics, another good reason for considering it an essential element in America's Revolution Settlement.[136]

Yet the political defeat of Federalism did not destroy the old Court forces in American society at large. In league with Republican moderates, they retained control of the judicial system which they used, often despite the known wishes of state and national legislatures, to encourage the redistribution of property in favor of wealthy entrepreneurs —the complex process by which "instrumentalism" evolved into "legal formalism" between the Revolution and the Civil War.[137] They discovered that they did not have to dominate politics or the central government to manipulate America's vast resources. In fact by mid-century judicial barriers against legislative interference probably seemed more valuable than any possible benefits that active political participation could bring. Thus, reluctantly at first but inevitably nonetheless, they largely abandoned national politics to the "plain republicans" and shifted their activities—and most of the potential for "corruption"—to the state and local levels of the Northeast and later the Northwest, where their enterprise, boosterism, ability, and greed ran amok across the land. Rapidly transforming Jefferson's "fee-simple empire" into the world's most commercial and industrial society, they soon outstripped the regulatory capabilities of local jurisdictions while Jeffersonian and Jacksonian opponents stood impotent guard over the inactive virtue of the central government. For that matter, the very inexpensiveness of democratic government may have contributed significantly to the frantic pace of industrial growth, for in the United States—unlike Britain—the government's military and naval needs, or even its civil expenditures, provided almost no drain upon the nation's productive resources. Even the Civil War proclaimed only a temporary interruption, and not a permanent change, in this pattern.[138]

In this way the Great Inversion became complete. America's Revolution Settlement centralized the Country and decentralized and largely depoliticized the Court. Big money, quite capable of buying a state legislature here or there and hence of acquiring real weight in the Senate by the 1880s, otherwise would not again play a sustained role in national politics between Jefferson's victory and the Hanna-McKinley triumph of 1896.[139] Because a decentralized and depoliticized Court is a contradiction in terms, this result merely stresses the decisiveness and permanence of the Settlement. Court politics, a real option before 1801, had become impossible by 1815. One is tempted to add the old cliché, that the Republicans won all the battles but evidently lost the war, except that the same verdict also applies to the Federalists—if we assume that their deepest aspiration was general recognition and acceptance of their status as a ruling class. Both parties would be equally appalled by what the United States has in fact become.

IX

The rest of the globe is correct about America. Aspects of its Revolution still inspire admiration abroad, especially its concern with human rights and dignity. But the Revolution Settlement is truly unique in its totality and quite inimitable in the way it has affected, or failed to affect, larger patterns of American life. Only in America did anti-Court forces, so conspicuous in their resistance to the war-making needs of European states between 1550 and 1789, win and retain possession of a central government designed by its framers, ironically enough, to make the United States competitive with other powers.[140] After 1801 they kept statist impulses well in check, almost resurrecting the Articles of Confederation within the Constitution. If the percentage of a government's revenue derived from

internal sources or direct taxes can serve as a reasonable though crude indicator of its power and influence, the United States did not reach the level of eighteenth-century Britain until fifty years ago.[141] The Third World, which inevitably links economic development to vigorous government, has little to learn from "plain republicanism" which, even in its own day, remained more nostalgic than modernizing. As armed citizens swarmed across the continent, the heirs of Jefferson continued to praise growth as expansion, not development, even while being trampled from behind by stampeding industrialization.[142]

What this tradition and Settlement should mean to us is another matter. In historiographical terms, the ideological school is right about the uniqueness of America (though a generation too early in the chronology of its triumph), but only because the Wisconsin school is correct about the overall pattern of social tensions. The most committed variety of Revolutionary resistance did evolve through Antifederalism into Jeffersonian democracy, and most "reluctant patriots" and ex-loyalists found their way into the Federalist Party.

Did Country domination of the central government check in hidden ways the rapacity of great wealth and contribute, somehow or other, to the material well-being of lesser people? Can anyone attach a quantitative value to the "politics of recognition" for ethnic minorities that Jefferson's party and its successors learned to practice with consummate skill? Humble immigrants could achieve a sense of dignity through politics and minor office-holding that was probably available to them in no other way. At the moment we lack adequate answers to these questions, partly because they are seldom posed quite so bluntly.[143] But prior to our bureaucratic age, Country rule does seem to have kept the sense of alienation to a minimum, or at least channeled it in an unusual direction. In America, except for the generation of older Federalists after 1800 and

Southerners after 1850, alienation has been directed at the society rather than the polity, until our own Vietnam-Watergate era.

Another and less flattering interpretation remains possible, inspired by the mammoth nineteenth-century disjunction between the wildly expanding participation in elections on the one hand, and the drastically shrinking responsibilities of the central government on the other. In the United States has politics instead of religion been the true "opiate of the people"—and of their historians?

Notes to Chapter 11

1. The author wishes to thank James M. Banner, Richard Buel, Jr., Douglas Greenberg, Ronald Hoffman, Robert F. Jones, James M. McPherson, James Kirby Martin, Drew R. McCoy, Stephen E. Patterson, Theodore K. Rabb, and Lawrence Stone for their helpful criticisms of this chapter as it went through various drafts.

2. Perceptive developments of the "new nation" theme include William N. Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776–1809* (New York, 1963); Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York, 1963); Thomas C. Barrow, "The American Revolution as a Colonial War for Independence," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd Series, 25 (1968), 452–64 (hereafter *WMQ,* 3rd Series unless otherwise stated); and Richard B. Morris, *The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution* (New York, 1970).

3. R. R. Palmer, "The Fading Dream: How European Revolutionaries Have Seen the American Revolution," in *The Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lectures: Essays on Modern European Revolutionary History,* ed. Bede K. Lackner and Kenneth Roy Philp (Austin, Tex., 1977), pp. 89–104.

4. See, generally, Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Parrington, Beard* (New York, 1968). The quotation is from Schlesinger, "The American Revolution Reconsidered," *Political Science Quarterly,* 34 (1919), 76–77.

5. Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis, Prologue to Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1953). The quotation is from p. 113.

6. Brown, *Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691–1780* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1955); Robert and B. Katherine Brown, *Virginia, 1705–1786: Aristocracy or Democracy?* (East Lansing, Mich., 1964).

7. Major statements by the ideological school for the period before 1789 include Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Bailyn, "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation," in *Essays on the American Revolution,* ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, 1973), pp. 3–31, especially 15 and 23; Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), especially p. 380; Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (New York, 1972); and Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill, 1968). For extensions into the period after 1789, see John R. Howe, Jr., "Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s," *American Quarterly,* 19 (1967), 147–65; Richard Buel, Jr., *Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789–1815* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972); and Lance G. Banning, *The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978).

8. For a fuller discussion of the Wisconsin school, many of whose works will be cited individually in this essay, see John M. Murrin's review of *The Human Dimensions of Nation Making: Essays on Colonial and Revolutionary America,* ed. James Kirby Martin (Madison, 1976), in *New York History,* 58 (1977), 97–101. Examples of growing dissatisfaction with the ideological interpretation include Jackson Turner Main's review of Gordon Wood, in *WMQ,* 26 (1969), 604–7; and cf. half-a-dozen reviews of Pauline Maier's book in the standard journals; Gary B. Nash's review of the Kurtz and Hutson *Essays* (above, n. 7) in *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 311–14; the exchange between Bailyn and Nash in *WMQ,* 32 (1975), 182–85; Joseph A. Ernst, "Ideology and the Political Economy of Revolution," *Canadian Review of American Studies,* 4 (1973), 137–48; Jesse Lemisch's "Bailyn Besieged in His Bunker," *Radical History Review,* 3 (Winter 1977), 72–83; a broad attack

by maybe half the participants at the *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*'s Conference on the American Revolution which met at Harvard in May 1975; and Edmund S. Morgan's review of Bailyn's *Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson,* in *The New York Review of Books,* 21 March 1974, pp. 7–10. These attitudes are hardly confined to Jensen's students at Wisconsin. For example, see *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism,* ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb, Ill., 1976).

9. Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1964); Martin, *Men in Rebellion: Higher Government Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1973); R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800* (Princeton, 1959–64). Marc Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst apply a Marxist perspective to the Revolution in their "An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution," *WMQ,* 29 (1972), 3–32. For the economic content of eighteenth-century ideology, see Isaac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, 1975); and Drew R. McCoy, "The Republican Revolution: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, 1776 to 1817" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976; publication expected, Chapel Hill, 1980).

10. Wood, "Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution," *WMQ,* 23 (1966), 3–32, tries to link his ideological emphasis with the older social interpretation, and his *Creation* (esp. chs. 12–13) revives Beardian themes from an unexpected direction, a point most of his reviewers seem to have missed. See also Wood's review of Jackson Turner Main's *Political Parties before the Constitution* (Chapel Hill, 1973), in *Canadian Historical Review,* 55 (1974), 222–23; Lockridge, "Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution," *Journal of Social History, 6* (1972–73), 403–39; Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York, 1976). For Pole see below, n. 63.

11. Isaac Kramnick, "Augustan Politics and English Historiography: The Debate on the English Past, 1730–35," *History and Theory,* 6 (1967), 33–56; J. P. Kenyon, "The Revolution of 1688: Resistance and Contract," in *Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb,* ed. Neil McKendrick (London, 1974), 43–69; and H. T. Dickinson, "The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution,'" *History,* New Series, 61 (1976), 28–45.

12. Palmer, *Age of the Democratic Revolution;* Palmer, "The Fading Dream"; Briton, *The Anatomy of Revolution,* rev. ed. (New York, 1952).

13. J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London, 1967); J. R. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688 in England* (New York, 1972); J. R. Western, *Monarchy and Revolution: The English State in the 1680s* (London, 1972).

14. P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756* (London, 1967); Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and his Circle,* especially 39–48; Peter Laslett, "John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the Origins of the Board of Trade, 1695–1698," *WMQ,* 14 (1957), 370–402; D. W. Jones, "London Merchants and the Crisis of the 1690s," in *Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500–1700: Essays in Urban History,* ed. Peter Clark and Paul Slack (London, 1972), pp. 311–55.

15. Charles Wilson, "The Other Face of Mercantilism," Royal Historical Society, *Transactions,* 5th Series, 9 (1959), 81–101.

16. Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and his Circle,* 188–200; J. Keith Horsefield, *British Monetary Experiments, 1650–1710* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chs. 12–17.

17. K. G. Davies, "Joint-Stock Investment in the Later Seventeenth Century," *Economic History Review,* 2nd series, 4 (1952), 285 (hereafter, *EcHR*).

18. The material on 1720, including the quotation, closely follows Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and his Circle,* pp. 66–67.

19. J. H. Plumb, "The Growth of the Electorate in England from 1600 to 1715," *Past & Present,* 45 (November 1969), 90–116; Plumb, "Political Man," in *Man versus Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Six Points of View,* ed. James L. Clifford (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 1–21; Geoffrey Holmes, *The Electorate and the National Will in the First Age of Party* (London, 1976); H. J. Habakkuk, "English Landownership, 1680–1740," *EcHR,* 1st Series, 10 (1939–40), 2–17; J.G.A. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment,* ch. 13.

20. Gary De Krey establishes this point in "Trade, Religion, and Politics in London in the Reign of William III" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1978).

21. Plumb, *Political Stability,* ch. 6; Kramnick, "Augustan Politics and English Historiography"; Jeffrey Nelson, "The Contradictions of Freedom: Ideology and the Emergence of the Liberal State in Great Britain," paper read at a conference of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (Philadelphia, November 1976). See also J. P. Kenyon, *Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party, 1689–1720* (Cambridge, 1977).

22. Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and his Circle, passim;* Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment,* especially pp. 422, 477.

23. N.F.R. Crafts, "English Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century: A Re-Examination of Deane and Cole's Estimates," *EcHR,* 2nd Series, 29 (1976), 226–35.

24. Stephen S. Webb, "The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson," *WMQ,* 23 (1966), 513–48; Webb, "Army and Empire: English Garrison Government in Britain and America, 1569 to 1763," *WMQ,* 34 (1977), 1–31. Cf. Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (New Haven, 1934–38), IV, *passim.*

25. John M. Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Provincial Massachusetts" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966), ch. 3; Leslie V. Brock, *The Currency of the American Colonies, 1700–1764: A Study in Colonial Finance and Imperial Relations* (New York, 1975), especially chs. 2–4.

26. Bernard Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York, 1968), argues that massive acceptance of Country ideology by the colonies explains why America and Britain parted ways in the Revolutionary era. He has been challenged by Jack P. Greene, "Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century," which appears with Bailyn's reply and Greene's rejoinder in *American Historical Review,* 75 (1969–70), pp. 337–67 (hereafter, *AHR*). On individual colonies, see Jere R. Daniell, "Politics in New Hampshire under Governor Benning Wentworth, 1741–1767," *WMQ,* 23 (1966), 76–105; John M. Murrin, "Review Essay," *History and Theory,* 11 (1972), 245–72; Robert M. Zemsky, *Merchants, Farmers and River Gods: An Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics* (New York, 1971); John A. Schutz, *William Shirley, King's Governor of Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill, 1961); Beverly W. McAnear, "Politics in Provincial New York" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1935), which still provides the most detailed account available of internal New York politics, especially from Governor Robert Hunter (1710–19) to William Cosby (1732–38); Patricia U. Bonomi, *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York, 1971); Stanley N. Katz, *Newcastle's New York: Anglo-American Politics, 1732–1753* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); Larry R. Gerlach, *Prologue to Independence: New Jersey in the Coming of the American Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976), especially pp. 21–23; Gerlach, *William Franklin: New Jersey's Last Royal Governor,* New Jersey's Revolutionary Experience, Pamphlet No. 13 (Trenton, 1975).

27. David Alan Williams, "Anglo-Virginian Politics, 1690–1735," in *Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675–1775,* ed. Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970), pp. 76–91; Williams, "Political Alignments in Colonial Virginia Politics, 1698–1750" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959); Leonidas Dodson, *Alexander Spotswood, Governor of Colonial Virginia, 1710–1722* (Philadelphia, 1939); Robert M. Weir, " 'The Harmony We Were Famous For': An Interpretation of Pre-Revolutionary South Carolina Politics," *WMQ,* 26 (1969), 473–501; M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663–1763* (Chapel Hill, 1966); W. W. Abbot, *The Royal Governors of Georgia, 1754–1775* (Chapel Hill, 1959).

28. Lawrence F. London, "The Representation Controversy in Colonial North Carolina," *North Carolina Historical Review,* 11 (1934), 255–70; Sydney V. James, "Colonial Rhode Island and the Beginnings of the Liberal Rationalized State," in *Essays in Theory and History: An Approach to the Social Sciences,* ed. Melvin Richter (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 165–85; Mack Thompson, "The Ward-Hopkins Controversy and the American Revolution in Rhode Island: An Interpretation," *WMQ,* 16 (1959), 363–75; Richard L. Bushman, *From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690–1765* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Charles A. Barker, *The Background of the Revolution in Maryland* (New Haven, 1940); Donnell M. Owings, *His Lordship's Patronage: Offices of Profit in Colonial Maryland* (Baltimore, 1953); James H. Hutson, "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751–1755: A Reappraisal," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* 93 (1969), 303–71 (hereafter, *PMHB*); Robert S. Hohwald, "The Structure of Pennsylvania Politics, 1739–1776" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1978).

29. Brock, *Currency of the American Colonies,* ch. 6; Joseph A. Ernst, "Genesis of the Currency Act of 1764: Virginia Paper Money and the Protection of British Investments," *WMQ,* 22 (1965), 33–74.

30. Oliver M. Dickerson, *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1951), argues for the effectiveness of the system; Thomas C. Barrow, *Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), finds widespread evasion. But careful investigation will probably reveal nothing in North America to match the scale of smuggling in the home islands. Cal Winslow, "Sussex Smugglers," in Douglas Hay *et al., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England* (New York, 1975), pp. 119–66; Hoh-cheung and Lorna H. Mui, "Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784," *AHR,* 74 (1968–69), 44–73; *idem.,* " 'Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling' Reconsidered" and W. A. Cole's rejoinder, "The Arithmetic of Eighteenth-Century Smuggling," both in *EcHR,* 2nd Series, 28 (1975), 28–49, provide a good introduction to the literature.

31. Lawrence A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (New York, 1939), ch. 19; Dickerson, *Navigation Acts,* ch. 3; and James M. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic Development of Colonial North America* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 91–92, 205–6, all agree on these points. Benjamin W. Labaree, partly by arguing that coffee consumption after 1790 must have been to some degree a substitute for tea, contends that three-fourths or more of the colonial tea supply was smuggled. But import data for the 1790s show that tea consumption also continued to increase, thus implying little relationship between the two. Compare Labaree, *The Boston Tea Party* (New York, 1964), ch. 1, especially p. 7, with U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, 1975), II, 902 (hereafter, *U.S. Hist. Stats.*).

32. Joseph J. Malone, *Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England, 1691–1775* (Seattle, 1964); Richard B. Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America* (New York, 1946), pp. 154–56 on the Hat Act; Arthur C. Bining, *British Regulation of the Colonial Iron Industry* (Philadelphia, 1933); Brock, *Currency,* pp. 325–33, on Rhode Island's very gradual compliance with the New England Currency Act.

33. Richard L. Merritt, *Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775* (New Haven, 1966), especially ch. 7.

34. Though it is not the author's main point, this distinction will emerge from a careful reading of J. M. Bumsted, " 'Things in the Womb of Time': Ideas of American Independence, 1633 to 1763," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 533–64. See also Bernhard Knollenberg, *Origin of the American Revolution: 1759–1766* (New York, 1960), pp. 7–8, 283 n. 4.

35. James A. Henretta, *The Evolution of American Society, 1700–1815: An Interdisciplinary Analysis* (Lexington, Mass., 1973), p. 42, Table 2.1; James F. Shepherd and Samuel H. Williamson, "The Coastal Trade of the British North American Colonies, 1768–1772," *Journal of Economic History,* 32 (1972), 783–810, especially 800–801, 804 (hereafter, *JEcH*); Gary Walton, "New Evidence on Colonial Commerce," *JEcH,* 28 (1968), 363–89; David C. Klingaman, "The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts," Essex Institute, *Historical Collections,* 108 (1972), 217–34. Egnal and Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution," use much of the same data for quite different purposes. Carville V. Earle, *The Evolution of a Tidewater Settlement System: All Hallow's Parish, Maryland, 1650–1783* (Chicago, 1975), ch. 5, argues for the increasing self-sufficiency of tobacco plantations in the eighteenth century. But his own data (see esp. pp. 122–23) show a significant decline after the 1740s in nearly all of his 27 selected items. Only spinningwheels surpassed all previous highs in the 1760s.

36. Bernard Bailyn, "1776: A Year of Challenge—A World Transformed," *Journal of Law and Economics,* 19 (1976), 437–66. In this valuable essay, Bailyn has begun to analyze the kind of social change that he believes is relevant to the coming of the Revolution.

37. Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution," in *Essays on the American Revolution,* ed. Kurtz and Hutson, especially pp. 65–74.

38. John M. Murrin, "The French and Indian War, the American Revolution and the Counter-factual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy," *Reviews in American History,* 1 (1973–74), 307–18.

39. Daniel Dulany offered the fullest refutation of virtual representation in his *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes . . .* (1765), in *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776,* ed. Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1965–), I, 598–658. See, generally, Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis,* and his "Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary Power, 1764–1766," *WMQ,* 5 (1948), 311–41.

40. Dickinson, *The Late Regulations respecting the British Colonies . . .* (1765), in *Pamphlets,* ed. Bailyn, I, 683.

41. "A Plain Yeoman," *Providence Gazette,* 11 May 1765; Dickinson to Pitt, 21 December 1765, both reprinted in *Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766,* ed. Edmund S. Morgan (Chapel Hill, 1959), pp. 72, 119.

42. Compiled from *The Dictionary of American Biography* and other standard biographical sources. On Goddard, see Ward L. Miner, *William Goddard, Newspaperman* (Durham, N.C., 1962), pp. 153–62, 169–72; and *Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763–1776,* ed. Merrill Jensen (Indianapolis, 1967), pp. 79–93.

43. P.D.G. Thomas, *British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American Revolution, 1763–1767* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 145–51, 162, 187–88, 214–15. Cf. Paul Langford, *The First Rockingham Administration, 1765–1766* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 117–25.

44. Neil R. Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760–1775: A Study of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution* (Annapolis, 1973).

45. *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 1200.

46. Henry Drinker to Abel Jones, 29 April 1770, *PMHB,* 14 (1890), 42. Easily the best history of the Townshend Crisis is Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763–1776* (New York, 1968), chs. 8–14.

47. Stephen E. Patterson, "Boston Merchants and the American Revolution" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1961). A similar theme is implicit in Edward C. Papenfuse, *In Pursuit of Profit: The Annapolis Merchants in the Era of the American Revolution, 1763–1805* (Baltimore, 1975).

48. Egnal and Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution," isolate British importers (that is, colonial merchants importing from Britain) as the mercantile group with the most severe grievances against the empire. But so far every local study suggests that they were loyalist to a heavily disproportionate degree—possibly more so than any other groups except high Crown officeholders and northern Anglican clergymen. By contrast, merchants concentrating in the West Indian or South European trades (including the wine islands) were strongly patriot. John W. Tyler is now pursuing this subject in a doctoral thesis at Princeton University. Meanwhile, see: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776* (New York, 1918), pp. 591–92 and *passim* (for Southern factors); Virginia D. Harrington, *The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1935), pp. 349–51; Thomas M. Doerflinger, "The Economic Structure of Philadelphia's Merchant Community, 1756–1791" (Senior thesis, Princeton University, 1974), a careful and imaginative study, especially 63–66. Charles Akers in a study (in progress) of Boston's wealthy Brattle Street Church finds that about one-fourth of its merchant members were loyalists, nearly all British importers or factors who owned few ships; David Edward Maas, "The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972), especially p. 142, gives the same percentage of loyalists among Boston merchants generally but analyzes them by levels of wealth, not patterns of trade. On the growth of mercantile specialization after 1750, see Philip L. White, *The Beekmans of New York in Politics and Commerce, 1647–1877* (New York, 1956), pp. 538, 540, 545–48 and *passim*—a neglected study of exceptional value; Walton, "New Evidence on Colonial Commerce"; Shepherd and Walton, *Shipping, passim.* On the shifting coalitions behind non-importation and widespread artisanal support, see Ronald Hoffman, *A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland* (Baltimore, 1973), chs. 2, 4; Richard Walsh, *Charleston's Sons of Liberty: A Study of the Artisans, 1763–1789* (Columbia, S.C., 1959); and Charles S. Olton, *Artisans for Independence: Philadelphia Mechanics and the American Revolution* (Syracuse, 1975). On smuggling and British seizures after about 1755, see Victor L. Johnson, "Fair Traders and Smugglers in Philadelphia, 1754–1763," *PMHB,* 83 (1959), 125–49; Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739–1763* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 326–468; Dickerson, *Navigation Acts,* ch. 9; Stout, *Royal Navy;* Arthur L. Jensen, *The Maritime Commerce of Colonial Philadelphia* (Madison, 1963), ch. 10; Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America," *WMQ,* 25 (1968), 371–407.

49. Donald C. Lord and Robert M. Calhoon, "The Removal of the Massachusetts General Court from Boston, 1769–1772," *Journal of American History,* 55 (1968–69), 735–55 (hereafter, *JAH*); Larry R. Gerlach, "Politics and Prerogatives: The Aftermath of the Robbery of the East Jersey Treasury in 1768," *New Jersey History,* 90 (1972), 133–68; Jean H. Vivian, "The Poll Tax Controversy in Maryland, 1770–76; A Case of Taxation *with* Representation," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* 71 (1976), 151–76 (hereafter, *MHM*); *Maryland and the Empire, 1773: The Antillon—First Citizen Letters,* ed. Peter S. Onuf (Baltimore, 1974), especially pp. 1–39; George M. Curtis III, "The Role of the Courts in the Making of the Revolution in Virginia," in *The Human Dimensions of Nation Making,* ed. Martin, pp. 121–46; Robert M. Weir, "North Carolina's Reaction to the Currency Act of 1764," *North Carolina Historical Review,* 40 (1963), 183–99; Jack P. Greene, "Bridge to Revolution: The Wilkes Fund Controversy in South Carolina, 1769–1775," *Journal of Southern History,* 29 (1963), 19–52.

50. David Ammerman, *In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774* (Charlottesville, 1974), especially ch. 2.

51. Adams to James Warren, 19 October 1775, *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress,* ed. Edmund C. Burnett (Washington, 1921–36), I, 236.

52. Laurens to William Livingston, 19 April 1779, *ibid.,* IV, 163.

53. See the authorities cited in notes 47–48, above.

54. David Syrett, *Shipping and the American War, 1775–1783: A Study of British Transport Organization* (London, 1970). A modern study of privateering would be quite useful.

55. Ammerman, *In the Common Cause,* ch. 3. Ammerman is more inclined than I to trace conservative weakness to a broad American consensus. For the willingness of Congressional moderates to grasp at almost any hope of conciliation, see Milton M. Klein, "Failure of a Mission: The Drummond Peace Proposal of 1775," *Huntington Library Quarterly,* 35 (1971–72), 343–80.

56. James H. Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746–1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences* (Princeton, 1972).

57. Rhys Isaac, "Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the Traditional Order in Virginia, 1765 to 1775," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 345–68; Anthony Gregg Roeber, "Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers: The Transformation of Virginia's Justices of the Peace, 1705–1805" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1977).

58. James S. Whittenburg, "Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers: Social Change and the Origins of the North Carolina Regulation," *WMQ,* 34 (1977), 215–38; Richard M. Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

59. The range of recent interpretations can be derived from Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home? Dutchess County, New York, in the American Revolution," *WMQ,* 18 (1961), 330–59; Sung Bok Kim, "A New Look at the Great Landlords of Eighteenth-Century New York," *WMQ,* 27 (1970), 581–614; Bonomi, *A Factious People,* ch. 6.

60. Gary S. Horowitz, "New Jersey Land Riots, 1745–1755" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1966); Alison G. Olson, "The Founding of Princeton University: Religion and Politics in Eighteenth-Century New Jersey," *New Jersey History,* 87 (1969), 133–50.

61. Martin, *Men in Rebellion, passim;* Stephen E. Patterson, *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts* (Madison, 1973), chs. 5, 6, and 8; Robert J. Taylor, *Western Massachusetts in the Revolution* (Providence, 1954), chs. 2–4; Edward M. Countryman, "Consolidating Power in Revolutionary America: The Case of New York, 1775–1783," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* 6 (1975–76), 645–77 (hereafter, *J Intdis. H*); Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home?"; Roger Champagne, "New York's Radicals and the Coming of Independence," *JAH,* 51 (1964–65), 21–40; Bernard Friedman, "The Shaping of the Radical Consciousness in Provincial New York," *JAH,* 56 (1969–70), 781–801; Stephen Brobeck, "Revolutionary Change in Colonial Philadelphia: The Brief Life of the Proprietary Gentry," *WMQ,* 33 (1976), 410–34; John K. Alexander, "The Fort Wilson Incident of 1779: A Case Study of the Revolutionary Crowd," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 589–612; Hoffman, *A Spirit of Dissension,* chs. 7–10; Hoffman, "The 'Disaffected' in the Revolutionary South," in *The American Revolution,* ed. Young, pp. 273–316; Thad W. Tate, "The Coming of the Revolution in Virginia: Britain's Challenge to Virginia's Ruling Class," *WMQ,* 19 (1962), 323–43; Robert M. Weir, "Who Shall Rule at

Home: The American Revolution as a Crisis of Legitimacy for the Colonial Elite," *J Intdis. H,* 6 (1975–76), 679–700.

62. Carl Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760–1776,* 2nd ed. (Madison, 1960), pp. 176–78, 239–43; Gerlach, *William Franklin,* pp. 30–32; Herbert E. Klingelhofer, "The Cautious Revolution: Maryland and the Movement toward Independence: 1774–1776," *MHM,* 60 (1965), 261–313; Richard A. Ryerson, *The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765–1776* (Philadelphia, 1978), describes the overthrow of the Pennsylvania assembly in 1776; Jackson Turner Main, *The Sovereign States, 1775–1783* (New York, 1973), pp. 165–66, discusses Delaware in 1776.

63. Patterson, *Political Parties,* pp. 143–48, 152; J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (London, 1966), pp. 226–44; Van Beck Hall, *Politics without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780–1791* (Pittsburgh, 1972).

64. Countryman, "Consolidating Power"; Pole, *Political Representation,* pp. 226–44; Martin, *Men in Rebellion;* Jackson Turner Main, "Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legislatures," *WMQ,* 23 (1966), 391–407.

65. Main, *Political Parties,* especially chs. 12–13.

66. Richard B. Morris, "Insurrection in Massachusetts," in *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History,* ed. Daniel Aaron (New York, 1952), pp. 20–49; for a partial list of other riots and disturbances, most of which have never been studied, see John P. Kaminski, "Democracy Run Rampant: Rhode Island in the Confederation," in *Human Dimensions of Nation Making,* ed. Martin, pp. 247–48 n. 13.

67. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic,* chs. 10, 12–13; J.G.A. Pocock, "Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," *J Intdis. H,* 3 (1972–73), 119–34.

68. E. James Ferguson, "The Nationalists of 1781–1783 and the Economic Interpretation of the Constitution," *JAH,* 56 (1969–70), 241–61; Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," *WMQ,* 27 (1970), 187–220; John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (New York, 1976), pp. 135–224; Russell F. Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780–1782* (Columbia, S.C., 1970); William A. Benton, "Pennsylvania Revolutionary Officers and the Federal Constitution," *Pennsylvania History,* 31 (1964), 419–35; Edwin G. Burrows, "Military Experience and the Origins of Federalism and Antifederalism," in *Aspects of Early New York Society and Politics,* ed. Jacob Judd and Irwin H. Polishook (Tarrytown, N.Y., 1974). pp. 83–92; Norman K. Risjord, "Virginians and the Constitution: A Multivariant Analysis," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 613–32.

69. E. James Ferguson, *The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776–1790* (Chapel Hill, 1961), chs. 8, 11; Jackson Turner Main, *The Antifederalists, Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788* (Chapel Hill, 1961), ch. 4; Stephen E. Patterson, "After Newburgh: The Struggle for the Impost in Massachusetts," in *Human Dimensions of Nation Making,* ed. Martin, pp. 218–42; Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781–1789* (New York, 1950), pp. 350–59.

70. Douglas M. Arnold, "Political Ideology and the Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776–1790" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1976); Kenneth Coleman, *The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763–1789* (Athens, Ga., 1958), pp. 271–75.

71. New England's antinationalism is stressed by both H. James Henderson, *Party Politics in the Continental Congress* (New York, 1974) and Joseph L. Davis, *Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774–1787* (Madison, 1977). See also, Rufus King to John Adams, 2 November 1785; Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong, 6 August 1786; James Monroe to Patrick Henry, 12 August 1786; Monroe to James Madison, 14 August 1786; Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 19 August 1786; Monroe to Madison, 3 September 1786, in *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress,* ed. Burnett, VIII, 247–48, 415–16, 424–25, 427, 445, 461; James Winthrop's "Agrippa" paper No. 12, in *Essays on the Constitution of the United States Published during its Discussion by the People, 1787–1788,* ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 1892), p. 92.

72. Forrest McDonald, *We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution* (Chicago, 1958), pp. 136–48, 182–202, 235–54, 321–46. Cf. Kaminski, "Democracy Run Rampant: Rhode Island in the Confederation."

73. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic,* pp. 514–16;

Alfred F. Young, *The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797* (Chapel Hill, 1967), p. 392, for the New York quotation; Buel, *Securing the Revolution,* pp. 101–2, for Beers.

74. Young, *Democratic Republicans;* Arnold, "Political Ideology and the Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania"; Leonard J. Sneddon, "State Politics in the 1790s" (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1972), ch. 2; Norman K. Risjord and Gordon Den Boer, "The Evolution of Political Parties in Virginia, 1782–1800," *JAH,* 60 (1973–74), 961–84.

75. Henderson, *Party Politics in the Continental Congress;* Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress, 1789 to 1796," *WMQ,* 28 (1971), 523–42; Henderson, "Quantitative Approaches to Party Formation in the United States Congress: A Comment," with Ryan's response, *WMQ,* 30 (1973), 307–25.

76. Kenneth W. Keller, "Diversity and Democracy: Ethnic Politics in Southeastern Pennsylvania, 1788–1799" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1971); Edward C. Carter II, "A 'Wild Irishman' Under Every Federalist's Bed: Naturalization in Philadelphia," *PMHB,* 94 (1970), 331–46; David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1965), pp. 201–26.

77. Lance G. Banning, "Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 167–88.

78. Banning, *The Jeffersonian Persuasion, passim;* Drew R. McCoy, "Republicanism and American Foreign Policy: James Madison and the Political Economy of Commercial Discrimination, 1789 to 1794," *WMQ,* 31 (1974), 633–46; McCoy, "The Republican Revolution," especially chs. 3–7.

79. Linda K. Kerber, *Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), ch. 4. Cf. Thomas Jefferson to Moses Robinson, 23 March 1801, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington, 1903), x, 236–37.

80. Ferguson, *Power of the Purse,* pp. 252–53, 256–57, 329.

81. Whitney K. Bates, "Northern Speculators and Southern State Debts: 1790," *WMQ,* 19 (1962), 30–48.

82. Hall, *Politics without Parties,* ch. 11; Snedden, "State Politics in the 1790s," p. 28; Ferguson, *Power of the Purse,* pp. 331–32.

83. Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, 1957), ch. 5; Brooke Hindle, *David Rittenhouse* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 331–32.

84. Jefferson, quoted in Robert Sobel, *The Big Board: A History of the New York Stock Market* (New York, 1965), p. 19. Cf. Robert F. Jones, "William Duer and the Business of Government in the Era of the American Revolution," *WMQ,* 32 (1975), 393–416.

85. Jefferson to Henry Remsen, 14 April 1792, quoted in Nathan Schachner, *Thomas Jefferson, a Biography* (New York, 1951–57), I, 466.

86. Calculated from *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 959.

87. Hammond, *Banks and Politics,* pp. 144–45, 190.

88. Computed from *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 750–51, 886, and B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 217, 220. In seven years for which data survive, 1800–1807, American shipbuilding averaged 111,200 "gross tons" per year. For the British Empire in all eight years, the average was 106,600 "net tons." Even if one subtracts 5–9% from gross tons to get net tons, the results are very nearly comparable. See John G. B. Hutchins, *The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789–1914: An Economic History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 303 n. 50 on this point. Elsewhere (p. 226 n. 15) Hutchins, following Albert Gallatin, suggests that as of 1800 tonnage figures for American carriers (not ship*building*) may have been inflated by as much as 200,000 tons out of the reported total of 972,000, which is accepted in *U.S. Hist. Stats.* Presumably sales abroad would account for the difference.

89. David Hackett Fischer, *America, A Social History. Volume I: The Main Lines of the Subject* (forthcoming) discusses the new polarization of wealth in this period, as does Edward Pessen for a slightly later era in his "The Egalitarian Myth and the American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the 'Era of the Common Man,'" *AHR,* 76 (1971), 989–1034. Although the numbers of poor began to increase rapidly in colonial cities around 1750, poverty inspired major reform movements only in the 1790s. Gary B. Nash, "Urban Wealth and Poverty in Pre-Revolutionary America," *J Intdis. H,* 6 (1975–76), 545–84; Nash, "Social Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Radicalism," in *The American Revolution,* ed. Young, pp. 3–36; Young, *Democratic Republicans,* pp. 252–56, 518–45. Cf. David J. Rothman,

The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Boston, 1971), especially chs. 1, 7.

90. Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802* (New York, 1975).

91. Poorly discussed in the secondary literature, the internal taxes of the Adams administration can be followed in *American State Papers: Finance* (Washington, 1832–59), I, 579–80, 616–22, 681–88, 718–27; Kohn, *Eagle and Sword,* pp. 157–73; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," ch. 7.

92. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword,* chs. 10–13; Marshall Smelser, *The Congress Founds the Navy* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1959).

93. Jerald A. Combs, *The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers* (Berkeley, 1970); Buel, *Securing the Revolution,* chs. 7–12—a major revision of Leonard W. Levy's *Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History: Legacy of Suppression* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) which, at least on the question of seditious libel, finds little difference between Federalists and Republicans. On the Disputed Elections Bill, designed to guarantee a Federalist succession in 1800, see Buel, pp. 208–10, and Albert J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall* (Boston, 1916–19), II, 452–58.

94. I am not aware of any study of American ideas of public order and revolution in the 1790s.

95. Palmer, "The Great Inversion: America and Europe in the Eighteenth-Century Revolution," in *Ideas in History: Essays presented to Louis Gottschalk by his Former Students* (Durham, N.C., 1965), pp. 3–19.

96. Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism,* pp. 207–8; Young, *Democratic Republicans,* pp. 42, 47, 455; Paul Goodman, *The Democratic Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), ch. 5.

97. Wallace Evan Davies, "The Society of the Cincinnati in New England, 1783–1800," *WMQ,* 5 (1948), 3–25, and Ethel E. Rasmussen, "Democratic Environment—Aristocratic Aspiration," *PMHB,* 90 (1966), 155–82, are both highly suggestive, especially when contrasted with James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828* (New York, 1966). The point about intermarriage derives mostly from reading hundreds of biographical sketches of graduates of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, but I have never attempted to measure the differences. James McLachlan, author of *Princetonians, 1748–1768: A Biographical Dictionary* (Princeton, 1977), shares this opinion.

98. Charles R. Ritcheson, *Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward the United States, 1783–1795* (New York, 1969); Hutchins, *American Maritime Industries,* chs. 6–8; James A. Field, Jr., *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 27–49; Jones, "William Duer"; McCoy, "The Republican Revolution," p. 182.

99. *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 750, 886; Allan R. Pred, *Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 1790–1840* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 28–29 and *passim.*

100. Plumb, *Political Stability,* ch. 5; G. W. Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne: The Peace and the Protestant Succession* (London, 1934) remains the fullest narrative of the Tory resurgence. For the Federalist revival and its limitations, see Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism;* Harry W. Fritz, "The Collapse of Party: President, Congress, and the Decline of Party Action, 1807–1817" (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1970); James M. Banner, Jr., *To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815* (New York, 1970); Victor Sapio, "Maryland's Federalist Revival, 1808–1812," *MHM,* 64 (1969), 1–17; James H. Broussard, "Regional Pride and Republican Politics: The Fatal Weakness of Southern Federalism, 1800–1815," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* 73 (1974), 23–33; J.C.A. Stagg, "James Madison and the 'Malcontents': The Political Origins of the War of 1812," *WMQ,* 33 (1976), 557–85; Norman K. Risjord, "Election of 1812," in *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968,* ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, 1971), I, 249–72; Irving Brant, *James Madison: Commander-in-Chief, 1812–1836* (Indianapolis, 1961), ch. 8; Frank A. Cassell, "The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812," *MHM,* 70 (1975), 241–59.

101. On presidential etiquette, compare Broadus Mitchell, *Alexander Hamilton: The National Adventure, 1788–1804* (New York, 1962), p. 13, with Jefferson's view, in *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York, 1944), pp. 175–76. On Adams, see James H. Hutson, "John Adams' Title Campaign," *New England Quarterly,* 41 (1968), 30–39; Wood, *Creation of the American Republic,* ch. 14; Manning J. Dauer, *The Adams Federalists* (Baltimore, 1953), ch. 3.

Cf. James D. Tagg, "Benjamin Franklin Bache's Attack on George Washington," *PMHB*, 100 (1976), 191–230.

102. Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism*, pp. 22–23.

103. Adams to Councillor Trumbull, 31 March 1791; Adams to Henry Marchant, 3 March 1792, *John Adams Letter Book, 1789–1793*, pp. 158, 168–69, Massachusetts Historical Society, Microfilms of the Adams Papers owned by the Adams Manuscript Trust, Part II, Reel 115 (Boston, 1955), quoted with permission. See also John R. Howe, Jr., *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams* (Princeton, 1966), especially chs. 4, 7; Joyce Appleby, "The New Republican Synthesis and the Changing Political Ideas of John Adams," *American Quarterly*, 25 (1973), 578–95.

104. Dauer, *Adams Federalists* contains much useful information about alignments on specific issues; Richard A. Harrison, sketch of Isaac Tichenor, *Princetonians: A Biographical Dictionary*, II (forthcoming). For the bank issue in 1811, see Hammond, *Banks and Politics*, p. 224.

105. For English Country support of naval power, see John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, *Cato's Letters: or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects*, 6th ed. (London, 1755), II, No. 64. For the argument against standing armies, see *ibid.*, III, Nos. 94–95, and Trenchard, *An Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government, and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy* (London, 1697); see also Lois G. Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!" The Anti-Army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Baltimore, 1974). Republican use of these arguments against a navy can be followed throughout Smelser's *Congress Founds the Navy*. On suffrage, see Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760–1860* (Princeton, 1960), especially chs. 8–9.

106. Levy, *Legacy of Suppression*, especially pp. 238–48, and ch. 6, *passim*.

107. Richard E. Ellis, *The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic* (New York, 1971).

108. George Dargo, *Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).

109. Examples include Richard E. Ellis, "The Political Economy of Thomas Jefferson," in *Thomas Jefferson: The Man, his World, his Influence*, ed. Lally Weymouth (London, 1973), pp. 81–95; and Marshall Smelser, *The Democratic Republic, 1801–1815* (New York, 1968), especially ch. 1. These references are not in any sense meant to be invidious. The present writer was equally or more perplexed by Jefferson's economic views until the appearance of Pocock's "Virtue and Commerce" and McCoy's "Republican Revolution."

110. *Ibid.* Garry Wills nicely developed Jefferson's preference for Scottish over English writers in the first of three lectures on Jefferson delivered at Princeton University, fall term, 1975. See, however, ch. 8, n. 18, above.

111. Jefferson's *Anas* (available in numerous editions) contains his strictures on Hamiltonian finance. For his views on banks in 1813, see Hammond, *Banks and Politics*, p. 195.

112. For Jefferson's reaction to the Panic of 1819, which left him insolvent because he had underwritten a friend's obligation, see his letter to John Adams, 7 November 1819, *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*, ed. Lester J. Cappon (Chapel Hill, 1959), II, 546–47.

113. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword*, pp. 253, 262, 302–3. For the very narrow role of the West Point Military Academy before the War of 1812, see Edward C. Boynton, *History of West Point and Its Military Importance during the American Revolution: And the Origin and Progress of the United States Military Academy* (New York, 1964), chs. 10–11.

114. Julia H. Macleod, "Jefferson and the Navy: A Defense," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 8 (1944–45), 153–84.

115. On Madison, see McCoy, "Republican Revolution," pp. 114, 120, 128–29, 166, 179, 212, 254, 256–57, 271–73, 296–97, 305–9, 311; on Gallatin, see Henry Adams, *The Life of Albert Gallatin* (Philadelphia, 1879), especially pp. 218–19, 270–74, 304, 321–22, 362; and Alexander S. Balinky, "Albert Gallatin, Naval Foe," *PMHB*, 82 (1958), 293–304; Balinky, "Gallatin's Theory of War Finance," *WMQ*, 16 (1959), 73–82.

116. Frank A. Cassell, *Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752–1839* (Madison, 1971). The quotation is from p. 49.

117. William T. Whitney, Jr., "The Crowninshields of Salem, 1800–1808: A Study in the Politics of Commercial Growth," Essex Institute, *Historical Collections*, 94 (1958), 1–36, 79–118; John

H. Reinoehl, "Some Remarks on the American Trade: Jacob Crowninshield to James Madison, 1806," *HMQ,* 16 (1959), 83–118.

118. George A. Billias, *Elbridge Gerry, Founding Father and Republican Statesman* (New York, 1976), especially chs. 11, 16, 19. For the quotation, see *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,* ed. Max Farrand, rev. ed. (New Haven, 1937), I, 123.

119. C. Edward Skeen, "Mr. Madison's Secretary of War," *PMHB,* 100 (1976), 336–55.

120. Young, *Democratic Republicans,* pp. 243–50. For political alignments in 1812, see the authorities cited in n. 100, above.

121. *The Case of Aaron Burr,* ed. V. B. Reed and J. D. Williams (Boston, 1960), pp. 119–22, 154, 174, 178.

122. Richard A. Harrison's sketch of Clymer, in *Princetonians,* II (forthcoming); Jacob E. Cooke, "Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the Encouragement of American Manufactures," *WMQ,* 32 (1975), 369–92; Cooke, "Tench Coxe, American Economist: The Limitations of Economic Thought in the Early Nationalist Era," *Pennsylvania History,* 42 (1975), 267–89; Robert D. Arbuckle, "John Nicholson and the Attempt to Promote Pennsylvania Industry in the 1790s," *ibid.,* 42 (1975), 99–114; Roland M. Baumann, " 'Heads I Win, Tails You Lose': The Public Creditors and the Assumption Issue in Pennsylvania, 1790–1802," *ibid.,* 44 (1977), 195–232; Baumann, "John Swanwick: Spokesman for 'Merchant-Republicanism' in Philadelphia, 1790–1798," *PMHB,* 97 (1973), 131–82.

123. *Works of Fisher Ames,* ed. Seth Ames (Boston, 1854), II, 354.

124. Adams, *Gallatin,* p. 313.

125. Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820* (New York, 1971).

126. Formisano, "Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic's Political Culture, 1789–1840," *American Political Science Review,* 68 (1974), 473–87. Cf., Paul Goodman, "The First American Party System," in *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development,* ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York, 1967), pp. 56–89; Sneddon, "State Politics in the 1790's," *passim.*

127. McCoy, "The Republican Revolution," pp. 251–57. The range of disagreement and factionalism among republicans can be gleaned from Norman K. Risjord, *The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson* (New York, 1965); Kim T. Phillips, "William Duane, Philadelphia's Democratic Republicans, and the Origins of Modern Politics," *PMHB,* 101 (1977), 365–87; and John S. Pancake, "The 'Invisibles': A Chapter in the Opposition to President Madison," *Journal of Southern History,* 21 (1955), 17–37.

128. Smelser, *The Democratic Republic,* ch. 15. Even New York's General Incorporation Law of 1811 was aimed primarily at stimulating household manufacturing. See Ronald E. Seavoy, "Laws to Encourage Manufacturing: New York Policy and the 1811 General Incorporation Statute," *Business History Review,* 46 (1972), 85–95.

129. Norris W. Preyer, "Southern Support of the Tariff of 1816—A Reappraisal," *Journal of Southern History,* 25 (1959), 306-22.

130. Jefferson to Henry Middleton, 8 January 1813, *Writings,* ed. Lipscomb, XIII, 203.

131. For major revisions of Bray Hammond's entrepreneurial interpretation of the bank war, see Jean Alexander Wilburn, *Biddle's Bank: The Crucial Years* (New York, 1967); James R. Sharp, *The Jacksonians versus the Banks: Politics in the States after the Panic of 1837* (New York, 1970). See also Frank Otto Gattell, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York City's Men of Quality," *Political Science Quarterly,* 82 (1967), 235–52; Herbert Ershkowitz and William G. Shade, "Consensus or Conflict? Political Behavior in the State Legislatures during the Jacksonian Era," *JAH,* 58 (1971–72), 591–621.

132. Young, *The Washington Community,* 31, Table 2.

133. *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 1142.

134. A major theme of Bailyn's *Origins of American Politics.*

135. Brown, *Middle-Class Democracy.* But by denying the impact of either deference or conflicting interests on colonial and revolutionary politics, Brown deprives the subject of the contingencies it obviously possessed as late as 1800 or even 1812. Young's *Democratic Republicans* carefully documents Clintonian mobilization of poorer voters as the 1790s progressed. Pole, *Political Representation,* Appendix II, provides statistics on voter turnout in several states. See also J.G.A. Pocock, "The Classical Theory of Deference," *AHR,* 81 (1976), 516–23; Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology and the French Revolution: A Question of Li-

berticide at Home," *Studies in Burke and His Times,* 17 (1976), 5–26.

136. Among many possible items, see especially Richard H. Brown, "The Missouri Crisis, Slavery, and the Politics of Jacksonianism," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* 65 (1966), 55–72; and Robert Kelley's brilliant synthesis, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," *AHR,* 82 (1977), 531–62.

137. Morton J. Horwitz, "The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780–1820," *Perspectives in American History,* 5 (1971), 287–326; Horwitz, "The Rise of Legal Formalism," *American Journal of Legal History,* 19 (1975), 251–64; Gerard W. Gawalt, "Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740–1840," *ibid.,* 14 (1970), 283–307; William E. Nelson, *Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), chs. 8–9, especially pp. 173–74.

138. Richard D. Brown, *Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600–1865* (New York, 1976), and his "The Emergence of Urban Society in Rural Massachusetts, 1760–1820," *JAH,* 61 (1974–75), 29–51, nicely develop a number of these themes. Peter Temin, *The Jacksonian Economy* (New York, 1969), demonstrates the government's trivial role in the economy, while Pred's *Urban Growth* charts what is really the emergence of a national economy. C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," *AHR,* 66 (1960–61), 1–19, stresses America's "free security" after 1815.

139. Richard J. Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896* (Chicago, 1971); Wallace D. Farnham, " 'The Weakened Spring of Government': A Study in Nineteenth-Century American History," *AHR,* 68 (1962–63), 662–80; Pocock, "Classical Theory of Deference," p. 523.

140. *Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660,* ed. Trevor Aston (New York, 1965) is excellent on European dimensions of this question. Need one add that the French monarchy collapsed during a fiscal crisis created by wartime expenditures?

141. Throughout the eighteenth century, customs duties provided only about a fourth of British revenues, and usually less than the land tax alone. Mitchell and Deane, *British Historical Statistics,* pp. 386–88. In the United States, internal revenues remained inconsequential until the Civil War, did not consistently

exceed customs until about 1911, and finally surpassed eighteenth-century British ratios only with American entry into World War I. *U.S. Hist. Stats.,* II, 1106.

142. Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); Major L. Wilson, "The Concept of Time and the Political Dialogue in the United States, 1828–48," *American Quarterly,* 19 (1967), 619–44.

143. A refreshing exception is Robert Kelley, *The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone* (New York, 1969). The term "politics of recognition" comes from Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), p. 243.

Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book

Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability.

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

CONTENTS